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Article
Opening the “Snake Pit”: Arming Teachers
in the War Against School Violence and the
Government-Created Risk Doctrine
DANIELLE WEATHERBY
In the aftermath of the horrific school shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in
Newtown, Connecticut, parents, students, and school administrators began to fear the
unthinkable—that a violent, ruthless criminal could invade their school campuses and
randomly target innocent youth. Even though statistics show that violent crime in
elementary and secondary schools is on the decline, trepidation and anxiety on school
campuses across the country is at an all-time high.
In response to this perceived threat, in 2013, lawmakers in over thirty states proposed
bills that, if passed, would authorize school officials to carry weapons on their persons
during the school day. Currently, at least eleven states have adopted this “armed-teachers”
approach in fighting the war against school violence.
This Article explores the potential § 1983 liability that the armed-teachers approach
could create. Historically, § 1983 shields public schools from liability for the injuries
resulting from the unforeseeable, violent acts of third parties. But when schools themselves
invite the risk onto campus, they become vulnerable, throwing schoolchildren into the
“snake pit” of danger and exposing themselves to liability under the government-created
risk doctrine. Walking the reader through the elements of a state-created danger claim
brought by a plaintiff whose injury or death was proximately caused by the armed-teachers
approach, this Article examines the inherent risk involved in bringing firearms into schools,
especially when guarded by inadequately trained, or in some cases untrained, teachers.
Furthermore, where school districts adopt armed-teachers policies and fail to
adequately train or supervise those teachers serving as quasi-security guards pursuant to
their policy, they expose themselves to Monell liability. Most districts that have adopted this
approach have done so for fiscal reasons, but because the cost of hiring security is lower
than the cost of the risk of injury and resultant damages incurred by the school, the moneysaving justification is foolhardy and, at best, illogical.
Finally, this Article cautions that schools must not lose sight of the appropriate role
and function of our schoolteachers. With education reform and teacher effectiveness at the
crux of a national debate, schools should be wary of muddying the role of our educators.
Instead, schools should allow teachers to focus on educating and leave the patrol-work to
the properly trained experts.
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Opening the “Snake Pit”: Arming Teachers
in the War Against School Violence and the
Government-Created Risk Doctrine
DANIELLE WEATHERBY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Noah Pozner, age six, “had a huge heart[,] . . . was . . . a little bit
rambunctious, [had] lots of spirit, . . . [and] was really the light of the
room.”1 Grace McDonnell, age seven, had just celebrated her birthday by
blowing out the candles on “a purple cake with a turquoise peace sign and
polka dots.”2 Grace “was all about peace and gentleness and kindness.”3
Chase Kowalski, age seven, loved baseball and the Cub Scouts and had
just asked Santa Claus for his missing two front teeth for Christmas.4 Ben
Wheeler, age seven, “loved The Beatles, lighthouses and the No. 7 train to
Sunnyside, Queens.”5 He “was an irrepressibly bright and spirited boy
whose love of fun and excitement at the wonders of life and the world
could rarely be contained.”6
On December 14, 2012, Noah, Grace, Chase, and Ben, along with
sixteen of their peers and six educators, lost their young lives when the
unthinkable happened at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown,
Connecticut.7 Within the span of approximately six horrific minutes, a lone
shooter, armed with semiautomatic pistols and an assault rifle, entered the
school and turned an entire nation upside-down.8
*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law; J.D. 2005, University of
Florida; B.A. 2002, Franklin and Marshall College. My deepest gratitude to Terri Day for her insightful
comments on earlier drafts, to Wynne Tan and Garrett Wilkins, my incredibly hardworking research
assistants, for their invaluable contributions, and to Kertis Weatherby, for his unwavering support.
1
Remembering the Sandy Hook Elementary Victims, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2012/
12/us/sandy-hook-victims/ [http://perma.cc/7WMA-58HM] (last visited Aug. 12, 2015).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
James Barron, Gunman Massacres 20 Children at School in Connecticut; 28 Dead, Including
Killer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2012, at A1.
8
Id.; George Colli, Sandy Hook: The First 15 Minutes, NBC CONN. (Aug. 26, 2013),
http://www.nbcconnecticut.com/troubleshooters/Sandy-Hook-The-First-15-Minutes-221260161.html
[http://perma.cc/FHP2-KXS7].
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The 2012 Sandy Hook massacre is the latest in a litany of horrifying
school shootings,9 including Columbine10 and the Virginia Tech11
tragedies. Recently, it seems that law enforcement officials are intervening
on a weekly, and sometimes even a daily, basis, preventing perpetrators
from inflicting violence on school campuses.12

9
On October 1, 1997, sixteen-year-old Luke Woodham killed two students and wounded seven in
Pearl, Mississippi. Timeline of Worldwide School and Mass Shootings: Gun-Related Tragedies in the
U.S. and Around the World, INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0777958.html#ixzz
2vJejlayE [http://perma.cc/X4XM-4XUD]. On December 15, 1997, fourteen-year-old Colt Todd
wounded two students when he shot at students in the parking lot in Stamps, Arkansas. Id. On March
24, 1998, thirteen-year-old Mitchell Johnson and eleven-year-old Andrew Golden killed four students
and one teacher and injured ten others outside Westside Middle School in Jonesboro, Arkansas. Id. On
May 21, 1998, fifteen-year-old Kip Kinkel killed two students and wounded twenty-two others in the
cafeteria of his Springfield, Oregon high school. Id. On February 29, 2000, a six-year-old shot young
classmate Kayla Rolland dead with a .32-caliber handgun at Buell Elementary School near Flint,
Michigan. Id. On March 21, 2005, sixteen-year-old Jeff Weise killed a teacher, security guard, five
students, and finally himself at his Red Lake, Minnesota middle school. Id. On September 27, 2006, six
students were held hostage at the Platte Canyon High School in Bailey, Colorado before one of the
students was killed by the perpetrator. Id. On October 3, 2006, thirty-two-year-old Carl Charles Roberts
IV killed five girls and himself and injured five other girls at West Nickel Mines Amish School in
Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania. Id. On February 14, 2008, former Northern Illinois graduate student
Stephen Kazmierczak shot and killed five students and wounded seventeen more in a classroom on the
Northern Illinois University campus. Id. On January 5, 2011, two people were killed and two injured
during a shooting at Millard South High School in Omaha, Nebraska. Id. On February 27, 2012, a
former student killed three students and injured six at Chardon High School in Chardon, Ohio. Id.
10
On April 20, 1999, in the small town of Littleton, Colorado, two high school seniors, Dylan
Klebold and Eric Harris, entered Columbine High School with guns, bombs, and knives during the
middle of the day and brutally murdered twelve students and a teacher. Columbine High School
Shootings, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/columbine-high-school-shootings [http://perma.cc/
KY7R-A63F] (last visited Sept. 12, 2015).
11
On April 16, 2007, Seung-Hui Cho, a senior at Virginia Polytechnic Institute in Blacksburg,
Virginia, shot and killed thirty-two people on the campus before taking his own life. Virginia Tech
Shootings Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/31/us/virginia-tech-shootings-fast-facts/
[http://perma.cc/ZE68-R7FB] (last updated Apr. 13, 2015).
12
See, e.g., Documents: Concerned Citizen Halted Teen’s Plan to Attack School, DODGE CITY
DAILY GLOBE (May 3, 2014), http://www.dodgeglobe.com/article/20140503/News/140509748 [http://
perma.cc/BL53-C3FA] (summarizing events that led to law enforcement officers’ arresting a
seventeen-year-old Minnesota boy who outlined in a 180-page journal his plans to kill his family, set a
fire to divert first responders, and then go to his school with bombs and guns and “kill as many students
as he could”); Chuck Hickey & Kent Erdahl, 3 Weld Central High School Students Arrested After
Alleged Threat, FOX31 (May 13, 2014), http://kdvr.com/2014/05/13/two-weld-central-high-schoolstudents-arrested-after-alleged-threat/ [http://perma.cc/8GAL-XMBK] (discussing the arrest of three
high school students after an alleged threat was made at Weld Central High School in Keenesburg,
Colorado); Michelle McConnaha, Hamilton High Student Charged with Graduation Shooting Threat,
MISSOULIAN (June 4, 2014), http://missoulian.com/news/local/hamilton-high-student-charged-withgraduation-shooting-threat/article_dfe0ca84-eb79-11e3-808a-001a4bcf887a.html [http://perma.cc/FF
2H-N9PN] (describing facts that led to the arrest of eighteen-year-old Adam Michael Chambers for
plotting to shoot students with an assault rifle at graduation); Gamaliel Ortiz, Arrests Made in GunRelated Threats Against Whitney, Rocklin High Schools, KCRA.COM (May 30, 2014),
http://www.kcra.com/news/local-news/news-sacramento/arrests-made-in-gunrelated-threats-agai nstwhitney-rocklin-high-schools/26244398#!UY4Jc [http://perma.cc/L7N8-VQST] (detailing events that
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With children as targets and school campuses seemingly vulnerable to
attack, parents, teachers, and administrators face difficult, perhaps
unanswerable, questions. At what point did school campuses become
battlegrounds, where schoolchildren go to learn in an environment
permeated with fear and terror? Do schools have a legal duty to protect
students from the random, unforeseeable violent acts of third parties?
What measures should schools take to anticipate and prevent these
unthinkable acts? Should teachers and school administrators actively
participate in schools’ efforts to guard and protect the children in their
custody by carrying weapons on their persons during the school day? Are
teachers the appropriate individuals to assume the role of security guards,
and are they adequately trained to use a weapon effectively during a fastpaced, traumatic, live-shooter event?
Schools have responded to these questions by implementing a variety
of measures to improve school safety. Safety measures on K-12 campuses
include the use of metal detectors, the presence of security guards, rules
and regulations regarding student conduct and dress, profiling of
potentially violent students, anti-bullying instructional programs, and
counseling and mediation.13
Despite the use of these broad measures, the National Rifle
Association and conservative-minded lawmakers insist that representatives
of every school in the country should be armed with guns in anticipation of
an attack.14 Consistent with this line of thinking, several states have
adopted a radical approach to protecting students from the unforeseeable,
violent crimes of third parties by arming teachers and school administrators
with handguns during the school day.15
led to arrest of an eighteen-year old and two minors on suspicion of gun-related violence targeted at
two high schools in Sacramento, California).
13
See SIMONE ROBERS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INDICATORS OF
SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2012, at 168 (2013) (detailing various safety measures used by schools
from 1999–2010).
14
See Thomas Christoph Keller, Comment, ABC’s and AR-15’s: Arming Arkansas’s Teachers, 67
ARK. L. REV. 687, 687 (2014) (quoting the infamous proclamation made by NRA CEO Wayne
LaPierre in the wake of the Sandy Hook massacre that “[t]he only thing that stops a bad guy with a gun
is a good guy with a gun”).
15
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 45-30-103 (Westlaw through 2015 amendments); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 17-40-102 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c10 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 legislation); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-64-1 (Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 49-6-815 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 37.0811 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 46 of 2015 Reg. Sess.); S.B. 164, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ark. 2015) (enacted). In addition, some institutions of higher learning are allowing students to
bring firearms to campus. E.g., Ian Millhiser, Five Pennsylvania State Schools Now Allowing Students
to Bring Guns on Campus, THINKPROGRESS (May 14, 2013, 5:50 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/
2013/05/14/2011711/five-pennsylvania-state-schools-now-allowing-students-to-bring-guns-on-campus/
[http://perma.cc/JY4R-4SFH] (reporting that in Pennsylvania, five state colleges and universities have
authorized students to carry guns on campus).
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To date, no school utilizing this strategy has faced a live-shooter
situation. However, research and anecdotal evidence suggest that
equipping teachers and school administrators with guns increases the risk
of harm to students; studies testing the efficacy of police training to
prepare officers for live-shooter situations demonstrate that even the best
training produces high rates of misfiring and bystander injuries.16 In light
of this evidence, it is readily apparent that teachers would be much less
effective than police officers in wielding guns during a live-shooter
situation. A recent training exercise in Arkansas during which a pro-gun
senator accidentally shot an actor posing as a teacher with a rubber bullet
illustrates that arming the untrained actually increases the likelihood of
harm during a live-shooter event. 17
This Article posits that while arming teachers may appear to be cost
effective and gives the perception of greater safety, it actually creates a
greater risk of foreseeable harm to students and exposes schools to legal
liability. Generally, schools owe no legal duty to protect students from
violence caused by third parties.18 However, this strict no-duty rule has
exceptions. Arming teachers constitutes a government-created danger and
pierces the no-duty rule. While schools, as government entities, and
teachers acting within the scope of their official duties are shielded from
liability based on common-law negligence, they can be held legally liable
for civil rights violations.19 The “armed teachers” model generates a
government-created risk, exposing schools to liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and ultimately frustrating its essential purpose: protecting children
and limiting school district liability.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II summarizes school districts’
varying responses to the rising threats of violence in the elementary and
secondary school setting. Part III first presents an overview of the current
legal landscape governing school district liability, cautioning districts that
courts have limited schools’ immunity to those situations in which the risk
involved was unforeseeable and outside the school’s direct control. It then
introduces two exceptions to the general no-duty rule: (1) where injury is
16

See infra notes 130–34 and accompanying text.
Beth Stebner, Arkansas State Senator Fires Back at Claims He Accidentally Shot Teacher in
Simulated School Shooting Exercise, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 29, 2013, 2:57 PM), http://www.nydaily
news.com/news/politics/state-sen-fires-back-claims-shot-teacher-simulated-shooting-article-1.1440705;
Igor Volsky, Oops: Senator Who Advocates Arming Teachers Accidentally Shoots Teacher with
Rubber Bullet, THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 29, 2013, 12:14 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/08/
29/2550001/oops-senator-advocates-arming-teacher-accidentally-shoots-teacher-rubber-bullet [http://pe
rma.cc/8G6V-4PKG].
18
See, e.g., Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 167, 170 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining that public
schools have a constitutional duty to protect students from harm caused by third parties only if there is
a “special relationship” between the school and the student and citing case law from other circuits
holding that there is generally no such relationship).
19
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
17
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caused by a government-created danger, and (2) where a municipality
failed to adequately train its employees after implementing a policy that
clearly necessitates proper training. Part IV analyzes the potential for
teacher liability when a gun-related injury or death is proximately caused
by the armed-teachers approach. It concludes that armed-teacher victims,
under the government-created risk doctrine, will be able to proceed at least
beyond the motion-to-dismiss stage, exposing teachers to § 1983 liability.
Part V then analyzes a school district’s potential Monell liability,
predicated upon the district’s adoption of an armed-teachers policy without
providing adequate training to its employees.
In conclusion, this Article suggests a roadmap for combating school
violence and cautions schools to be wary of muddying the role of our
schoolteachers. With education reform and teacher effectiveness at the
crux of a national debate, this Article advises schools to allow teachers to
focus on educating, and leave the patrol-work to the properly-trained
experts.
II. SCHOOL DISTRICTS’ RESPONSES TO THREATS
OF VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS
In the wake of the last few decades, during which horrific tragedies
like Columbine, Virginia Tech, and Sandy Hook became a real peril to
schoolchildren across the country, parents of primary and secondary
schoolchildren began to perceive,20 justifiably or not,21 a heightened threat

20
See, e.g., EDWARD GAUGHAN ET AL., LETHAL VIOLENCE IN SCHOOLS: A NATIONAL STUDY 2
(2001), http://www.alfred.edu/teenviolence/docs/lethal_violence_in_schools.pdf [http://perma.cc/4R3
R-463C] (indicating that more than 75% of secondary schoolchildren believe that a school shooting
could occur in their community); Lydia Saad, Parents’ Fear for Children’s Safety at School Rises
Slightly, GALLUP (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/159584/parents-fear-children-safetyschool-rises-slightly.aspx (indicating that more than 50% of parents of primary and secondary
schoolchildren believe that a school shooting is “very or somewhat likely” to occur in their
community); School Violence, Gun-Related Injuries in Top 10 Child Health Concerns in U.S., 22 C.S.
MOTT CHILD. HOSP. NAT’L POLL ON CHILD. HEALTH 1 (2014), http://mottnpch.org/sites/default/files/
documents/081114_top10.pdf [http://perma.cc/GG9K-A3AM] (finding that school violence and gunrelated injuries were fifth and ninth, respectively, in the national top ten child health concerns list).
21
See DIANNA A. DRYSDALE ET AL., CAMPUS ATTACKS: TARGETED VIOLENCE AFFECTING
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 11 (2010), http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/campusattacks.pdf [http://perma.cc/3RJB-37RQ] (analyzing the circumstances and potential reasons for the
increase in violence over the last two decades on college campuses and noting that the spike could be
caused by increased enrollment, media coverage, and digital reporting). But see NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS & BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY 2001, at
iii (2001), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2002/2002113a.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q9H6-VGFU] (indicating a
decrease in violent crime in schools); Todd A. DeMitchell, Locked Down and Armed: Security
Responses to Violence in Our Schools, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 275, 278 (2014) (“[S]chool-associated
violent deaths are rare and declining.”).
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22

of violence on campus. In response to this perceived threat, lawmakers,
school administrators, and parent advocacy groups have implemented
various approaches to minimize the risk.
Aimed at preventing the most extreme forms of violence, among the
most commonplace safety measures used in schools today are weapons
deterrence23 and the use of campus security and police officers.24 In the
2009–2010 school year, 84% of high schools, 73% of middle schools, and
51% of primary schools reported that they used security cameras to
monitor their schools.25 In addition, schools commonly use metal detectors
and conduct searches on student lockers and bags, especially in large urban
middle and high schools.26
School districts and local law enforcement are increasingly teaming up
to ensure that more campuses have a security-guard presence. According to
the National Center on Education Statistics, 43% of schools reported the
presence of one or more security guards, security personnel, School
Resource Officers (SROs), or sworn law enforcement officers at their
schools at least once a week during the school year.27 Of that 43%, 12% of
primary schools, 25% of all combined K-12 schools, 51% of middle
schools, and 63% of high schools reported that their security officers
routinely carried a firearm at school.28
President Barack Obama has allotted millions of dollars nationwide to
fund more SROs in schools that opt to utilize them.29 This executive
22

School Violence, Gun-Related Injuries Among Top 10 Child Health Concerns in U.S., supra

note 20.
23
In 1990, Congress passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which made it unlawful for “any
individual knowingly to possess a firearm” in a school zone. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1998 ed., Supp.
V.). After facing a constitutional challenge in the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995), where the Court held that the law exceeded Congress’ authority under the Commerce
Clause, id. at 551, the law was amended to forbid the possession in a school zone of a firearm that “has
moved in or that otherwise affects” interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2012). The law
does not appear to prohibit school districts from allowing teachers or other school officials to carry or
discharge firearms on campus pursuant to a district-sanctioned security program. At the state level,
“almost all states and D.C. prohibit guns in K-12 schools, but only 39 states and D.C. apply this
prohibition to people who have been granted a permit to carry a concealed weapon.” Guns in Schools
Policy Summary, LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (Nov. 1, 2013), http://smartgunlaws.org/
guns-in-schools-policy-summary/#footnote_29_5686 [http://perma.cc/5CUF-6L5R].
24
ROBERS ET AL., supra note 13, at 86–88 (noting that 43% of K-12 and 28% of primary schools
reported the presence of one or more security staff at their school at least once a week in 2009–2010).
25
Id. at 84.
26
Id. at 86.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 88.
29
See Evan Perez & Bryan Koenig, Obama Admin Funding Cops in Schools, CNN (Sept. 27,
2013, 4:31 PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2013/09/27/obama-admin-borrows-a-page-fromthe-nra-funding-cops-in-schools/ [http://perma.cc/5RXL-LH7V] (explaining that the Community
Oriented Policing Services grants, about $125 million over a three-year period and announced annually
by the Justice Department, will be given priority to place armed police officers in schools); see also
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support follows the trend initiated by former President Bill Clinton in 1999
when he introduced the Safe Schools/Healthy Students Initiative and
provided federal funding to over fifty communities for anti-violence
programming.30 In 2000, former President Clinton bolstered the use of
campus officers by providing more than $60 million to support 452
officers nationwide as part of the Justice Department’s COPS in Schools
program.31
With a rising number of schools utilizing SROs on campus, skeptics
and critics on both sides of the “guns-in-school” debate are passionately
voicing their concerns. Advocates of placing armed representatives on
K-12 campuses urge either for a larger presence or a more aggressive role,
outraged that shootings are still occurring at schools, while opponents
argue that the presence of SROs is unnecessary, ineffective, or overly
burdensome and expensive.32 In fact, opponents point to the fact that
Columbine high school employed an armed security officer on April 20,
1999.33 Although community resource officer Neil Gardner engaged in a
shootout with perpetrator Eric Harris, the exchange of gunfire did not deter
Harris from entering the school building and continuing on with his killing
spree.34
Wherever one’s position lies with respect to the use of security
measures in K-12 schools, most can agree that armed security officers, if
used, should be properly trained and well-prepared to respond to another
Columbine- or Sandy Hook-like event. Several organizations have created
training programs for school security, including programs designed to
simulate a live-shooter situation.35 Still, in an effort to cut costs, many
DeMitchell, supra note 21, at 283 (summarizing the executive response to the shooting at Sandy Hook
Elementary School).
30
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Clinton Administration Launches $300 Million Program
for Safe Schools (Apr. 1, 1999), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/1999/April/114ag.htm
[http://perma.cc/9P78-4MJM].
31
Lawrence L. Knutson, Clinton Pledges Funds to Add Police to Schools, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 16,
2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/apr/16/news/mn-20323 [http://perma.cc/XNB3-7WRP].
32
Compare William J. Bennett, The Case for Gun Rights Is Stronger than You Think, CNN (Dec.
19, 2012, 3:54 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/19/opinion/bennett-gun-rights [http://perma.cc
/HUC9-8L7P] (arguing that firearms are the best defense against an armed attacker), with LZ
Granderson, Teachers with Guns Is a Crazy Idea, CNN (Dec. 19, 2012, 3:57 PM), http://www.cnn.com
/2012/12/19/opinion/granderson-guns-in-schools/index.html?iref=allsearch [http://perma.cc/XNQ6-FE
4K] (“[W]hen it comes to our schools, we don’t need guns at all.”), and School Resource Officers Are a
Waste of Resources, Says New Report, JUSTICE POL’Y INST. (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.justice
policy.org/news/3178 [http://perma.cc/H2FN-DT9X] (“[H]aving school resource officers . . . and other
police in schools causes more harm than good.”).
33
Amanda Terkel, Columbine High School Had Armed Guard During Massacre in 1999,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/21/columbine-armedguards_n_2347096.html [http://perma.cc/MCY7-H65E].
34
Id.
35
See, e.g., TACTICAL DEFENSE INST., http://tdiohio.com/home_page/ [http://perma.cc/BB572VZ9] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015). The Tactical Defense Institute, a West Union, Ohio organization
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states have passed legislation or are interpreting existing legislation to
allow teachers and administrators to carry guns on campus during the
school day.36 In 2013, more than thirty state legislatures introduced bills
that would permit school officials to carry guns on public or private school
campuses.37
Among others, states like Arkansas,38 Kansas,39 Colorado,40 South
Dakota,41 Tennessee,42 Texas,43 and Utah44 authorize schools to allow
teachers and other personnel to carry firearms on campus during the school
day. Notably, these laws indicate a vast disparity regarding the amount of
required training for teachers participating in armed-teachers programs.
For example, Kansas law leaves it up to a governing school body, such as a
school board, to prescribe any training requirements, while the Tennessee
law requires all teachers participating in such a program to complete a
forty-hour training program.45 The Georgia “guns-everywhere” law allows
boards of education to adopt an armed-teachers policy, but it does not set
forth a minimum number of training hours for participating teachers and
school staff.46 Utah is one of the only states that authorizes individuals who
hold concealed carry permits to carry licensed, concealed weapons onto
public school campuses without exception.47 Utah teachers do not have any

training civilians and law enforcement and military personnel, offers the recently created “Armed
Teacher Training Program,” a three-day program that trains civilians and officers on how to respond to
school shootings. Armed Teacher Training Program, TACTICAL DEFENSE INST., http://tdiohio.com/
active-killer-shooter-leciv/ [http://perma.cc/948B-T3W6] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015); see also Joshua
Jamerson, Teachers Pack Heat at Gun School, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Mar. 28, 2013),
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2013/03/27/Teachers-learn-to-shoot-in-the-classroom
.html [http://perma.cc/YX27-LE6N] (describing the above-mentioned program).
36
See, e.g., Keller, supra note 14, at 688–89 (recounting the efforts of some school districts in
Arkansas to lawfully arm public school employees).
37
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., ARMING TEACHERS AND K-12 SCHOOL STAFF: A
SNAPSHOT OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION 1 (2014), http://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/
NCSL-Arming-Staff-Brief.pdf [http://perma.cc/8RUV-QD6J].
38
ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-40-102(10), (19) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); S.B. 164,
90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015) (enacted).
39
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c10(d) (West, Westlaw through 2015 legislation).
40
Nick McGurk, Rural Colo. School Allowing Teachers to Carry Handguns, USA TODAY (Oct.
31, 2013, 9:01 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/31/colorado-teachers-gunsschools/3323807 [http://perma.cc/5CUX-HGYM].
41
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-64-1 (Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
42
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-815 (1), (2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.).
43
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.0811(c) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 46 of 2015 Reg. Sess.).
44
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-505.5 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Gen. Sess.).
45
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c10(d) (West, Westlaw through 2015 legislation); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 49-6-815(a)(3) (West , Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.).
46
Safe Carry Protection Act, § 16-11-130.1(b), 2014 Ga. Laws 599, 616.
47
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-505.5(4)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Gen. Sess.).
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specific requirements other than those required to obtain concealed carry
permits.48
III. PROTECTING THE HERD: SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF SCHOOL
DISTRICTS’ LEGAL DUTY TO PROTECT
When a child falls victim to a shooting on a public school campus, her
parents and survivors have few legal remedies. Generally, schools and
teachers cannot be sued in their official capacities for negligence unless
sovereign immunity is waived.49 Injured parties may, however, bring a
federal cause of action against a school district, as an arm of the
government, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.50 That section provides an avenue
through which a plaintiff can sue a state entity in federal court for the
deprivation of her constitutional rights.51 Section 1983 holds liable anyone
acting under color of state law who “subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and [federal] laws.”52 A § 1983 claimant must satisfy
two elements: (1) she was “deprived of an existing federal right,” and (2)
“the deprivation occurred under color of state law.”53
With respect to gun-related injuries, the constitutional right implicated
in § 1983 actions is the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process
right.54 The touchstone of due process is protection against government
power arbitrarily and oppressively exercised.55

48
Id. Please see the Appendix for a more detailed overview of state laws that currently allow
teachers to “pack heat” during the school day.
49
Many states statutorily bar suits against municipalities. Plaintiffs seeking to recover against a
school district based on a state law negligence theory should check to see if their jurisdiction provides
sovereign immunity to school districts.
50
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see also Susan S. Bendlin, Shootings on Campus: Successful § 1983
Suits Against the School?, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 41, 49–50 (2013) (“The specific constitutional right
implicated in school shooting claims is a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right.”).
51
42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Deborah Austern Colson, Note, Safe Enough to Learn: Placing an
Affirmative Duty of Protection on Public Schools Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 169, 171 (1995) (explaining the monetary advantages to bringing a § 1983 claim).
52
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
53
Colson, supra note 51, at 172.
54
Id.; see also, e.g., Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 722 (3d Cir. 1989)
(involving a suit against a school district under § 1983 and the Due Process Clause, U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1, for the molestation of a student); Finch v. Texarkana Sch. Dist. No. 7, 557 F. Supp.
2d 976, 980 (W.D. Ark. 2008) (involving a suit against a school district under § 1983 and the Due
Process Clause for sexual assault); Maxwell ex rel. Maxwell v. Sch. Dist. of City of Phila., 53 F. Supp.
2d 787, 790 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (involving a suit against a school district under § 1983 claiming a
deprivation of due process rights for incidents of rape that occurred at school).
55
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368,
374 (3d Cir. 1999).
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The Due Process Clause provides that no state entity may “deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”56 School
shooting victims advance the theory that they have been deprived of “life”
or “liberty” due to the school’s failure to protect them from the violent acts
of third parties.57 But, the U.S. Supreme Court, which has “traditionally
interpreted the Constitution as a ‘charter of negative liberties,’ setting forth
restrictions on government power rather than imposing even the most
minimal affirmative duties,”58 has explained that the purpose of the Due
Process Clause is to “protect the people from the State, not to ensure that
the State protected them from each other.”59
Indeed, the Due Process Clause “forbids the state itself to deprive
individuals of life, liberty, or property without ‘due process of law.’”60
Generally, however, a state entity has no affirmative duty to protect
“against invasions of private actors.”61 As Justice Rehnquist best
explained, “our cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses
generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such
aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which
the government itself may not deprive the individual.”62
While it is well-established that a state actor does not have an
affirmative duty to protect its students,63 courts have recognized two
exceptions to this rule: (1) the special relationship theory64 and (2) the
state-created danger doctrine.65 Moreover, school districts may also find
themselves exposed to Monell liability for adopting an armed-teacher
policy.66 In determining whether a district is liable under Monell, courts
ask whether the underlying constitutional violation was ratified by some
56

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Id.; see also Bendlin, supra note 50, at 43–44.
58
Rebecca Aviel, Compulsory Education and Substantive Due Process: Asserting Student Rights
to a Safe and Healthy School Facility, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 201, 204 (2006) (quoting Bowers v.
DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982)).
59
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).
60
Id. at 195 (emphasis added).
61
Id.; Matican v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Deshaney, 489
U.S. at 195); Jones v. Reynolds, 438 F.3d 685, 690 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Deshaney, 489 U.S. at
195).
62
Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 196.
63
Id.; cf. Lisa E. Heinzerling, Comment, Actionable Inaction: Section 1983 Liability for Failure
to Act, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1048 (1986) (advancing the argument that the “no affirmative duty to
protect” approach is misguided); Steven F. Huefner, Affirmative Duties in the Public Schools After
Deshaney, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1940 (1990).
64
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197–98 (noting petitioner’s advancement of the special relationship
theory but declining to accept it).
65
D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1373–74
(3d Cir. 1992) (recognizing the state-created danger doctrine but declining to adopt it in this case).
66
See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (holding that
municipalities can be named as defendants in a § 1983 lawsuit).
57
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municipally established policy, practice, or custom. Each of these
exceptions provides a likely avenue of recovery to victims of school
shootings that are proximately caused by the armed-teachers approach.
IV. TEACHER “STATE ACTOR” LIABILITY UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
School shooting victims may bring a § 1983 action against both an
individual teacher (the “state actor”) whose actions proximately caused
their injuries and the school district itself, which may have proximately
caused their injuries because of a school-created policy or practice.
Consequently, both individual actors and the school district are vulnerable
to liability for any injuries proximately caused by the armed-teachers
approach.
A. School-Student: A Special Relationship?
According to public opinion, many American citizens believe that
schools should protect schoolchildren from violence on campus. This
general consensus is reflected in the stance adopted by the U.S.
Department of Education68 and the Obama Administration.69 This widely
held opinion is based, in part, on the unique relationship between parents,
schools, and the state that mandates, through compulsory education laws,
that children attend elementary and secondary schools.70 The argument
follows that because the state mandates that children attend school and
parents entrust their children to schools during the day, the student-school
relationship is custodial in nature, giving rise to a duty to protect children
during the school day.71 To date, however, the Supreme Court has veered
from its no-government-duty rule only under exceptional circumstances.
67

Id. at 694.
Working to Keep Schools and Communities Safe, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www.ed.gov/
school-safety [http://perma.cc/TWZ2-8Q4S] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) (“Ensuring that schools are
sanctuaries for teaching and learning—and free of crime and violence—is a priority for President
Obama, the administration, and the entire nation.”).
69
See THE WHITE HOUSE, NOW IS THE TIME: THE PRESIDENT’S PLAN TO OUR CHILDREN AND
OUR COMMUNITIES BY REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE 10 (2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/docs/wh_now_is_the_time_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AMT-DJGR] (stating that the government,
along with the cooperation of schools, “need to make our schools safer, not only by enhancing their
physical security and making sure they are prepared to respond to emergencies like a mass shooting,
but also by creating safer and more nurturing school climates that help prevent school violence”).
70
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, COMPULSORY SCHOOL REQUIREMENTS,
http://www.ncsl.org/print/educ/compulsoryschagechart.pdf [http://perma.cc/6STD-3JF5] (last visited
Sept. 19, 2015).
71
See Ali Davison, Note, Shackled and Chained in the Schoolyard: A New Approach to Schools’
Section 1983 Liability Under the Special Relationship Test, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 273, 290
(2012) (“The special relationship exception is intended to induce the state to protect those who are
made vulnerable by restraints imposed by the state itself. When states use compulsory schooling laws
to mandate that children are to be separated from their primary caregivers during the school day, this
68
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In the landmark case DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services,72 the Supreme Court held that a special relationship exists,
imposing an affirmative duty to protect, only when a state entity confines a
person in its custody against her will, rendering that person unable to care
for herself.73 Consequently, state entities have an affirmative duty to
protect people who are incarcerated or institutionalized, as they are
officially considered to be in the custody of the state and unable to care for
themselves.74 Some courts have also imposed an affirmative duty arising
out of a special relationship on state entities that foster children.75
Although the Supreme Court has declined to acknowledge a “special
relationship” between a school and its students, it has yet to decide whether
compulsory education laws impose a duty on schools to protect children
during the school day.76 Several circuit courts have considered whether
state compulsory attendance laws create a special relationship between
public schools and their students, and those circuits generally have held
that forced school attendance does not create a custodial relationship
establishing an affirmative duty upon the school to protect its students
because schools are not responsible for students’ “basic needs.”77
limits the liberties of individuals who are already particularly vulnerable members of society.”
(footnote omitted)); see also Bendlin, supra note 50, at 52–54 (discussing the “special relationship
exception” at length and explaining that “when the state affirmatively restrains an individual’s freedom
to act on his or her own behalf, a special relationship is created and the state owes the restrained
individual a constitutional duty of care and protection”).
72
489 U.S. 189 (1989).
73
Id. at 199–200.
74
Id. at 198–99 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976)); see also Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1982) (recognizing the substantive due process component of the
Fourteenth Amendment to include the responsibility of states to ensure the “reasonable safety” of
institutionalized mental patients); Bendlin, supra note 50, at 52–53 (discussing the “special relationship
exception” in the context of incarceration, institutionalization, and “other similar restraints of personal
liberty” (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200)).
75
D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1372 (3d
Cir. 1992) (noting that “some courts have imposed a constitutional duty to protect foster children by
analogy to involuntarily institutionalized individuals” and citing such cases).
76
See Bendlin, supra note 50, at 54 (“[T]he Supreme Court has not specifically addressed
whether a special relationship under the Due Process Clause exists between a student and a public
school.”).
77
E.g., Graham v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-89, 22 F.3d 991, 994 (10th Cir. 1994) (explaining that
this court has “clearly held compulsory school attendance laws do not spawn an affirmative duty to
protect,” even when danger may be “foreseeab[le]”); Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729,
732 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Public school attendance does not render a child’s guardians unable to care for
the child’s basic needs.”); Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1372 (holding that requiring a high school student
to attend class did not prevent her from being able to meet her “basic human needs,” and thus no
special relationship existed); Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 732–33 (10th Cir. 1992)
(“Compulsory attendance laws do not alter the fact that parents retain ultimate responsibility for their
child’s food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and reasonable safety.”); J.O. v. Alton Cmty. Unit Sch.
Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272–73 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that compulsory school attendance does not
restrict a child from meeting his or her “basic human needs,” and thus a school district has no
affirmative duty to protect schoolchildren).
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In Morrow v. Balaski, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that a school had no duty arising out of a special relationship to
protect two students from verbal and physical assault inflicted upon them
by another student.79 The court clarified its holding in D.R. v. Middle
Bucks Area Vocational Technical School,80 in which it recognized a
difference between the type of custody that the state possesses over
involuntarily committed patients or incarcerated prisoners and that which it
possesses over schoolchildren.81 Despite the fact that the Supreme Court in
Vernonia School District 47J82 recognized that children were “committed
to the temporary custody of the State”83 for the purposes of upholding
random drug testing of student athletes, the Third Circuit explained that
schoolchildren are never in the full custody of the school because they
remain “primarily dependent on their parents.”84
The Third Circuit’s staunch position with respect to the special
relationship rule has come under significant criticism. Commentators have
condemned this approach, arguing that the student-school relationship is
inherently “special” because of the requirement that children attend
school.85 Nonetheless, since attendance at school neither relieves parents of
the ability to take care of their children’s basic needs nor confines children
against their will, no special relationship exists giving rise to a school’s
affirmative duty to protect. Consequently, victims of school shootings will

78

719 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 171.
80
972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc).
81
Id. at 1371–72.
82
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
83
Id. at 654. The Court did admonish, “we do not, of course, suggest that public schools as a
general matter have such a degree of control over children as to give rise to a constitutional ‘duty to
protect.’” Id. at 655.
84
Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 173 (3d Cir. 2013).
85
See Aviel, supra note 58, at 227 (“While Scalia attempted to forestall the natural conclusion
that the responsibility would ‘as a general matter’ give rise to a constitutional duty to protect as
contemplated by DeShaney, the caveat was limited to a subordinate clause, unsupported by a reference
to other case law or factual findings and utterly at odds with the rest of the Court’s analysis . . . .”
(footnote omitted)); Colson, supra note 51, at 193 (“[T]he Supreme Court has explicitly acknowledged
children’s dependency on school officials for protection, and it has allowed schools to relax individual
students’ rights in order to protect the student body as a whole.”); Davison, supra note 71, at 290
(criticizing the fact that there has been some inconsistency in Supreme Court precedent concerning the
presence of a custodial relationship between schools and students); cf. Recent Case, D.R. v. Middle
Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992), 106 HARV. L. REV. 1224,
1228 (1993) (noting that other decisions regarding the constitutional rights of students have relaxed
these rights in order to allow school officials to promote safety); Michael Gilbert, Comment, Keeping
the Door Open: A Middle Ground on the Question of Affirmative Duty in the Public Schools, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 471, 501 (1993) (“[T]he idea of foregoing the categorical “special relationship” doctrine in
favor of a more direct inquiry into vulnerability and access to assistance is well-supported in literature
and case law.”).
79
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not find solace in the special-relationship exception to the general no-duty
rule.
B. Opening the “Snake Pit:”86 The State-Created Danger Doctrine
After the Newtown, Connecticut school shooting, Arkansas Senator
Jeremy Hutchison passionately spearheaded the advocacy effort to arm
Arkansas teachers with guns.87 However, after participating in an “active
shooter” simulation in Clarksville, Arkansas, during which he mistook “a
teacher who was confronting a . . . ‘bad guy’” as being the perpetrator and
shot the teacher with a rubber bullet,88 Hutchinson called the incident
“utterly ridiculous” and confessed that his position on arming teachers with
guns had shifted.89 Now recognizing how chaotic even a shooting
simulation can be, Hutchinson confessed that the exercise “opened [his]
eyes,”90 and that his “position now is that schools must have control over
security systems. It’s a complex issue—police need training, and it needs
to be continual.”91
Hutchinson and other avid supporters of the armed-teachers approach
have changed their tunes after opening their eyes to the potential risks
posed by allowing minimally trained, or in some cases untrained, teachers
and administrators to carry firearms on school campuses.92 When a school
or its agents knowingly and voluntarily bring a danger onto campus and
put students at greater risk, even supporters of the armed-teachers approach
can agree that the school’s voluntary invitation of danger should trigger a
duty to protect students from any potential injuries resulting from that
danger. Although courts have not extended the special relationship
exception to the no-duty rule in school settings, there is a second exception
86
The Seventh Circuit famously stated, in referring to the state-created danger doctrine, that “[i]f
the state puts a man in a position of danger from private people and then fails to protect him, it will not
be heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown
him into a snake pit.” Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
87
Beth Stebner, Arkansas State Senator Fires Back at Claims He Accidentally Shot Teacher in
Simulated School Shooting Exercise, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.nydailynews
.com/news/politics/state-sen-fires-back-claims-shot-teacher-simulated-shooting-article-1.1440705; Igor
Volsky, Oops: Senator Who Advocates Arming Teachers Accidentally Shoots Teacher with Rubber
Bullet, THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 29, 2013), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/08/29/2550001/oopssenator-advocates-arming-teacher-accidentally-shoots-teacher-rubber-bullet/ [http://perma.cc/WFV6FLP9].
88
Volsky, supra note 87.
89
Stebner, supra note 87.
90
Id.
91
Id. (emphasis added).
92
See, e.g., Chelsea B. Sheasley, Guns in Schools: Arkansas District Will Arm 20 Teachers and
Staff, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 30, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/USA-Update/2013/
0730/Guns-in-schools-Arkansas-district-will-arm-20-teachers-and-staff [http://perma.cc/8NM6-FM85]
(illustrating how twelve Kansas school districts withdrew support for a proposal to arm teachers after
their insurer informed the districts that they would be uninsurable, citing too much risk).
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that would impose a duty on school districts to protect students from
violence.
The state-created danger exception opens a school and its agents up to
liability by recognizing an inherent affirmative duty to protect students
from harms that are brought onto campus by the school itself or its
employees.93 Originally drawn from language in Deshaney,94 and now
recognized in most of the circuits,95 the state-created danger theory applies
when a plaintiff establishes the following four elements:96 (1) a state actor
performs an affirmative act that creates or increases the risk of injury to the
93
See D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1373–74 (3d
Cir. 1992) (“Liability under the state-created danger theory is predicated upon the states’ affirmative
acts which work to plaintiffs’ detriments in terms of exposure to danger.”); see also Gremo v. Karlin,
363 F. Supp. 2d 771, 782 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (“The rule that the state has no responsibility to protect its
citizens from the violent acts of private parties finds a second exception when a state actor creates a
danger that harms an individual or renders him or her more vulnerable to that danger.”).
94
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201–02 (1989).
95
Almost all of the eleven circuits have expressly recognized the state-created danger exception,
with the First and Fourth Circuits applying it on a case-by-case basis. The Fifth Circuit has consistently
side-stepped the question of whether to adopt it. Note, however, the Fifth Circuit is not opposed to
adopting the doctrine. See Estate of C.A. v. Castro, 547 F. App’x 621, 626–27 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he
district court did not hold that the state-created danger doctrine was ‘not viable’ in the Fifth Circuit.
Rather, it evaluated the doctrine, noted that the circuit has yet to adopt the theory, and concluded that
‘the present case would not appear to provide the right vehicle for the Fifth Circuit to adopt the statecreated danger doctrine’ because ‘[t]he plaintiffs would fail to satisfy one or more of the necessary
elements suggested in Covington.’ We agree.” (alterations in original)); Doe ex rel. Magee v.
Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 864 (5th Cir. 2012) (stating that the court “declin[ed] to use
[the] en banc opportunity to adopt the state-created danger theory in this case because the allegations
would not support such a theory”). Notably, the Fifth Circuit in Morris v. Dearborne, 181 F.3d 657,
663–64, 672 (5th Cir. 1999), in which a teacher falsely authored a report that a four-year-old student
was sexually molested, serving as the basis for removing the child from his family home, held that a
§ 1983 claim could survive based on a state actor’s conduct that subjected the child to the deprivation
of rights. Without invoking the state-created danger exception, the court explained:

The district court . . . stated that direct participation is not necessary for liability
under § 1983. Any official who “causes” a citizen to be deprived of her
constitutional rights can also be held liable. The district court held that the requisite
causal connection is satisfied if the defendant set in motion a series of events that the
defendant knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to deprive the
plaintiff of her constitutional rights. . . . We agree with the district court that in order
to establish Dearborne’s liability, the Plaintiffs must prove that she set in motion
events that would foreseeably cause the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights.
Id. at 672.
96
Some circuits articulate the elements differently. See Erwin Chemerinksy, The State-Created
Danger Doctrine, 23 TOURO L. REV. 1, 15–18 (2007) (explaining how the test for state-created danger
varies in certain jurisdictions). For purposes of this Article’s analysis, the four elements outlined above
generally represent the main inquiries involved in any circuit premised upon the state-created danger
doctrine. The last element, discussed in depth in Part IV.B.4, infra, has been interpreted more leniently
in some circuits. See, e.g., Walker v. Detroit Pub. Sch. Dist., 535 F. App’x 461, 464 (6th Cir. 2013)
(articulating the final element of a state-created danger claim as requiring that “the state knew or should
have know that its actions specifically endangered the plaintiff”).
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plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff is a member of a discrete class of persons, as
opposed to the public at large; (3) the defendant’s affirmative act is the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s harm, and the harm ultimately caused
was reasonably foreseeable and fairly direct; and (4) the act “shocks the
conscience” of the court.97
Much of the case law providing context for the state-created danger
exception in the school setting comes out of the Third and Tenth Circuits.98
In the seminal Tenth Circuit case, Armijo ex rel. Chavez v. Wagon Mound

97
See Willhauck v. Town of Mansfield, 164 F. Supp. 2d 127, 134–35 (D. Mass. 2001) (outlining
the First Circuit elements as: (1) a state actor performs an affirmative act increasing the risk of harm,
and (2) the act shocks the conscience); Santucci v. Newark Valley Sch. Dist., No. 3:05-CV-0971, 2005
WL 2739104, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2005) (outlining the Second Circuit elements as follows: (1)
“the [state] actor must have acted affirmatively;” (2) “there must be evidence that the state actor had
culpable knowledge of the danger;” (3) “there must be evidence that the state actor’s conduct caused
the injury;” and (4) “there must be evidence that the state actor’s conduct was so egregious or
outrageous that it is conscience-shocking”); Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 177 (3d Cir. 2013)
(outlining the Third Circuit elements as: (1) “the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly
direct;” (2) “a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience;” (3) “a
relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of
the defendant’s acts, or a member of a discrete class of persons subjected to the potential harm brought
about by the state’s actions, as opposed to a member of the public in general;” and (4) “a state actor
affirmatively used his or her authority in a way that created a danger to the citizen or that rendered the
citizen more vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at all”); Carroll K. v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 19 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624 (S.D.W. Va. 1998) (looking to the elements that the Third Circuit
adopted because the Fourth Circuit has not articulated its own test); Cartwright v. City of Marine City,
336 F.3d 487, 493 (6th Cir. 2003) (outlining the Sixth Circuit elements as: (1) “an affirmative act by
the state which either created or increased the risk that the plaintiff would be exposed to an act of
violence by a third party;” (2) “a special danger to the plaintiff wherein the state’s actions placed the
plaintiff specifically at risk, as distinguished from a risk that affects the public at large;” and (3) “the
state knew or should have known that its actions specifically endangered the plaintiff”); King ex rel.
King v. East St. Louis Sch. Dist. 189, 496 F.3d 812, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2007) (outlining the Seventh
Circuit elements as: (1) “the state, by its affirmative acts, must create or increase a danger faced by an
individual;” (2) “the failure on the part of the state to protect an individual from such a danger must be
the proximate cause of the injury to the individual;” and (3) “the state’s failure to protect the individual
must shock the conscience”); Avalos v. City of Glenwood, 382 F.3d 792, 799 (8th Cir. 2004) (outlining
the Eighth Circuit elements as: (1) the plaintiff must be a member of a “limited, precisely definable
group;” (2) the state’s conduct must have placed plaintiff “at significant risk of serious, immediate, and
proximate harm;” (3) the risk must have been obvious or known to the state; (4) the state must have
“acted recklessly in conscious disregard of the risk;” and (5) “in total, [the state’s] conduct shocks the
conscience”); Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1062–64 (9th Cir. 2006) (outlining the
Ninth Circuit elements as: (1) the state must have affirmatively created a danger; and (2) the state must
have exhibited deliberate indifference to a danger that was known or obvious); Armijo ex rel. Chavez
v. Wagon Mound Pub. Schs., 159 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998) (outlining the Tenth Circuit
elements as: (1) the plaintiff was “a member of a limited and specifically definable group;” (2) the
state’s conduct must have placed plaintiff “at substantial risk of serious, immediate and proximate
harm;” (3) the risk must have been obvious or known to the state; (4) the state must have “acted
recklessly in conscious disregard of the risk;” (5) in total, the state’s conduct shocks the conscience;
and (6) the actors must have affirmatively acted to increase the risk of harm to the plaintiff).
98
E.g., Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 301–02 (3d Cir. 2006); Armijo ex rel. Chavez v. Wagon
Mound Public Schs., 159 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998).
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99

Public Schools, the family of a sixteen-year-old, mentally ill special
education student (Armijo), who committed suicide, sued Wagon Mound
Public Schools alleging that the school deprived him of substantive due
process.100 After Armijo threatened physical harm to a teacher, he was
suspended.101 The principal directed the school guidance counselor, who
was aware of Armijo’s suicide risk, to drive Armijo home without
notifying his parents.102 Armijo’s parents returned home hours later to find
their son lying dead in the bedroom from a self-inflicted gunshot wound to
the chest.103 In considering whether the school’s actions in sending a
mentally ill student home without notifying the parents constituted a “statecreated danger,” the court explained that:
The key to the state-created danger cases . . . lies in the state
actors’ culpable knowledge and conduct in affirmatively
placing an individual in a position of danger, effectively
stripping a person of her ability to defend herself, or cutting
off potential sources of private aid. Thus the environment
created by the state actors must be dangerous; they must
know it is dangerous; and, to be liable, they must have used
their authority to create an opportunity that would not
otherwise have existed for the third party’s [acts] to occur.104
Where the proof showed that school officials knew Armijo was depressed
and suicidal, and that he had access to firearms at home, the facts were
sufficient to survive summary judgment on Armijo’s state-created danger
claim.105
1. Affirmative Act that Creates or Increases the Risk to the Plaintiff
Many of the school district cases in which plaintiffs have raised the
state-created danger exception have been dismissed for want of affirmative
danger-creating action.106 Finding an actor liable under the state-created
99

159 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1256.
101
Id. at 1256–57.
102
Id. at 1257.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 1263 (citations omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 201 (5th
Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir.
1993) (holding that plaintiffs “may state claims for civil rights violations if they allege state action that
creates, or substantially contributes to the creation of, a danger or renders citizens more vulnerable to a
danger than they otherwise would have been”); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990)
(explaining that DeShaney “establishes the possibility that a constitutional duty to protect an individual
against private violence may exist in a non-custodial setting if the state has taken affirmative action
which increases the individual’s danger of, or vulnerability to, such violence beyond the level it would
have been at absent state action.”).
105
Armijo, 159 F.3d at 1264.
106
See, e.g., Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 301–02, 312 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (finding no
100
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danger theory is based on “affirmative acts by the state which either create
or increase the risk that an individual will be exposed to private acts of
violence.”107 Stated differently, the plaintiff must “allege affirmative acts
that were the ‘but for cause’ of the risks they faced,” and mere “failures to
act cannot form the basis of a valid § 1983 claim.”108
In the school context, the concept is the same. Consequently, courts
have overwhelmingly held that a school district’s failure, either to carry out
its disciplinary policy or to intervene in student conduct that poses a risk to
others, constitutes merely passive inaction and does not satisfy the
“affirmative act” requirement.109 In this vein, in Walker v. Detroit Public
School District,110 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed a shooting
victim’s state-created danger claim against a school district premised upon
the district’s merger of two schools with a known history of gang-related
violence.111 The court explained that the merging of the two schools was
not an affirmative act because “chronic gang-related violence was present
both before and after the merger.”112 Ultimately, neither the merger of the
state-created danger in student suicide case where counselor did not detect signs of suicidal ideation
and, thus, there was no creation of any danger in releasing student); Wyke v. Polk Cnty Sch. Bd., 129
F.3d 560, 569–70 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding no state-created danger despite the fact that school officials
were aware of thirteen-year-old boy’s recent suicide attempts because the school did nothing
affirmative to heighten the boy’s suicide risk); Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 2d
1107, 1121 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (finding no state-created danger where thirteen-year-old homosexual
student committed suicide after enduring two years of bullying and physical assault because the
complained-of conduct constituted school inaction (failure to intervene), not affirmative action).
107
Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir. 1998).
108
Bennett ex rel. Irvine v. City of Philadelphia, 499 F.3d 281, 287–88 (3d Cir. 2007); see also,
e.g., Ye v. United States, 484 F.3d 634, 641–42 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that government-employed
physician’s assurance that a cardiac patient was “fine,” without rendering more advanced treatment, did
not constitute an affirmative act that gave rise to a claim for a constitutional deprivation, even if the
facts supported a state law medical malpractice claim); Jones v. Reynolds, 438 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir.
2006) (holding that a police officer’s observation and subsequent failure to intervene in a dangerous
drag race on a public street did not constitute an “affirmative act” increasing any risk to a spectator);
Stover v. Camp, 181 F. App’x 305, 308 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that an injured driver’s state-created
danger claim could not prevail against the township for failing to make an intersection where multiple
accidents had occurred safer because no affirmative action was pled); Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d
27, 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that the state’s inaction, even despite its promise to protect a witness
in exchange for her testimony in a murder trial, was not an affirmative act that satisfied a state-created
danger claim).
109
See, e.g., Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 178 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that the school’s
failure to expel a student-bully—instead suspending her—did not enhance or exacerbate the danger
caused to two other student victims); see also Robinson v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 13-6632, 2014 WL
3304143, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. July 8, 2014) (holding that a school district’s failure to prevent excessive
bullying did not amount to affirmative action such that the elements of a state-created danger claim
could be satisfied); Thomas v. East Orange Bd. of Educ., 998 F. Supp. 2d 338, 353–54 (D.N.J. 2014)
(holding that school district’s failure to prevent excessive bullying did not amount to affirmative action
in satisfaction of the state-created danger claim).
110
535 F. App’x 461 (6th Cir. 2013).
111
Id. at 466.
112
Id.
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schools nor the school’s failure to intervene in the gang violence
constituted an affirmative act that created or increased the risk of harm to
the plaintiff.113
Similarly, in Morrow v. Balaski,114 where school officials told parents
of two female students that were harassed and physically assaulted by a
third female student that they could not guarantee the girls’ safety, the
court declined to find any affirmative act sufficient to satisfy a statecreated danger claim.115 After a physical altercation between one of the
daughters and the attacker, the school suspended both students and allowed
them to return after they served the duration of their suspensions.116 The
court rejected the Plaintiffs’ argument that the act of allowing the attacker
to return to school was an “affirmative act” sufficient to create a risk,
explaining that the “[c]omplaint simply attempt[ed] to redefine clearly
passive inaction as affirmative acts.”117
But, in recognizing that the “line between action and inaction is not
always easily drawn,”118 the Third Circuit in Middle Bucks explained that
“[i]f the state puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and
then fails to protect him, . . . it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had
thrown him into a snake pit.”119 Therefore, the threshold inquiry requires a
difficult parsing out of action from inaction. “Rather than focusing on the
often metaphysical question of whether [officials’] behavior amounts to
affirmative conduct or not, we have focused on whether [the victim] was
safer before the state action than he was after it.”120 Furthermore, the Third
Circuit has emphasized, “it is the misuse of state authority, rather than a
failure to use it, that can violate the Due Process Clause.”121
A state-created danger claim premised upon the armed-teachers
approach undoubtedly satisfies the affirmative act requirement. Unlike in
Walker and Morrow, where the complained-of actions resulted in a student
environment with the same amount of risk or danger as before the
complained-of conduct,122 the implementation of the armed-teachers
approach actually invites a new danger onto campus. Instead of preserving

113

Id.
719 F.3d 160 (3d. Cir. 2013).
115
Id. at 178.
116
Id. at 164.
117
Id. at 178.
118
Id. at 177.
119
D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1374
(quoting Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982)).
120
Walker v. Detroit Public School Dist., 535 F. App’x 461, 464–65 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Koulta v. Merciez, 477 F.3d 442, 445–46 (6th Cir. 2007)).
121
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original)
(quoting Bright v. Westmoreland County, 443 F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir. 2006).
122
Walker, 535 F. App’x at 466; Morrow, 719 F.3d at 178.
114
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the status quo, as the school actors did in Walker and Morrow, the armedteachers approach creates and enhances a new risk to students.
Under the state-created danger doctrine, “liability exists when the state
affirmatively places a particular individual in a position of danger the
individual would not have otherwise faced.”123 When minimally-trained
teachers bring firearms onto K-12 campuses, they are placing students in a
position of danger the students would not otherwise have faced.
The current guns-in-school debate has focused primarily on the
correlation between the presence of guns on school campuses and the
overall rate of school crimes. While the statistical data supports both sides’
positions,124 there is ample data evidencing the fact that the presence and
use of guns (as opposed to other forms of weapons), because of their
inherently dangerous and deadly nature, results in both higher incidences
of injuries and in injuries that are more severe.125 The armed-teachers
approach increases incidences of gun-related injuries and death by inviting
onto campus three main threats: (a) a higher risk of misfires and stray
bullets due to inadequately-trained, or in some cases untrained, teachers;
123
Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511, 516 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122,
1125 (7th Cir. 1993)).
124
See, e.g., JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUNCONTROL LAWS 3 (3d ed. 2010) (referencing a survey that found “about 95 percent of the time that
people use guns defensively, they merely have to brandish a weapon to break off an attack”); William
Alan Bartley & Mark A. Cohen, The Effect of Concealed Weapons Laws: An Extreme Bound Analysis,
36 ECON. INQUIRY 258, 259 (1998) (“[W]e find strong support for the hypothesis that the right-to-carry
laws are associated with a decrease in the trend in violent crime rates.”); John R. Lott, Jr. & David B.
Mustard, Crimes, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1997)
(noting that one study suggests that overall defensive gun use saves lives (citing Gary Kleck & Marc
Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150 (1995))); Carlisle E. Moody, Testing for the Effects of Concealed Weapons
Laws: Specification Errors and Robustness, 44 J.L. & ECON. 799, 812 (2001) (concluding that
additional analyses of the Lott and Mustard data confirm that the “[p]assage of a right-to-carry
concealed weapons law tends to reduce violent crime.”). But see Ian Ayres & John J. Donahue III,
Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1201 (2003)
(“[T]he statistical evidence that these laws have reduced crime is limited, sporadic, and extraordinarily
fragile.”); Mark Duggan, More Guns, More Crime, 109 J. POL. ECON. 1086, 1087–88 (2001)
(“[C]hanges in homicide and gun ownership are significantly positively related.”); Jens Ludwig,
Concealed-Gun-Carrying Laws and Violent Crime: Evidence from State Panel Data, 18 INT’L REV. L.
& ECON. 239, 239 (1998) (finding that statistics “suggest that shall-issue laws have resulted, if
anything, in an increase in adult homicide rates.”).
125
Carl W. Chamberlin, Johnny Can’t Read ‘Cause Jane’s Got a Gun: The Effects of Guns in
Schools, and Options After Lopez, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 281, 287 n.49 (1999) (finding that
guns are two to five times more lethal than knives (citing JAMES D. WRIGHT ET AL., UNDER THE GUN:
WEAPONS, CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 198 (1983))); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATES 7 (1964), https://archive.org/stream/uniformcrimerepo1963unit#page/6/mode/2up
(finding, based on an examination of all assaults in 1963, that guns are “seven times more lethal than
all other weapons combined.”); Linda L. Dahlberg et al., Guns in the Home and Risk of a Violent Death
in the Home: Findings from a National Study, 160 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 929, 935 (2004) (“The
findings of this study add to the body of research showing an association between guns in the home and
risk of a violent death.”).
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(b) a school official’s impulsive, irrational misuse of a weapon; and (c) the
risk of gun-related accidents as a result of greater gun accessibility in the
school building.
a. Scenario A: A Higher Risk of Misfires and Stray Bullets Due to
Inadequately-Trained Teachers
Opponents of the armed-teachers approach express concern that
armed-teacher laws and school district policies currently do not mandate
sufficient firearms, trauma response, and other relevant training for
teachers carrying firearms on campus.126 Without adequate training, the
argument goes, there is a greater probability that gun-related accidents will
occur, resulting in a higher risk of bystander injury and death.
When analyzing states’ mandatory training requirements, both the
quantity and the quality of the training are important. Of the states with
statutory authorization of the armed-teachers approach, some of them
require minimal or even no training.127 Those that do require training do
not necessarily require simulated live-shooter training or training that will
prepare teachers who otherwise have no law enforcement experience to
respond during a traumatic live-shooter event in a safe manner.128
Short of adopting inhumane and risky research methods, it is
impossible to obtain reliable data on the effectiveness of an armed
teacher’s response during a live-shooter event. Nonetheless, the
overwhelming body of research indicating a high correlation between
126
See PEW RESEARCH CTR., IN GUN CONTROL DEBATE, SEVERAL OPTIONS DRAW MAJORITY
SUPPORT 1 (2013), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/01-14-13%20Gun%20Policy%20
Release.pdf [http://perma.cc/H2SR-FLTP] (finding that 57% of the 1502 Americans surveyed are
against the idea of arming teachers); WINTHROP UNIV., FEBRUARY 2013 WINTHROP POLL tbl. 39
(2013), http://www.winthrop.edu/uploadedFiles/wupoll/February2013WinthropPollMethodologyandRe
sults.pdf [http://perma.cc/PC45-6GEA] (finding that two-thirds of the 1038 South Carolinians surveyed
are opposed to arming teachers in schools); see also, e.g., David Beem, Back to School: Lock and Load,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-beem/back-to-school_b_37
62195.html [http://perma.cc/4YDF-JKNT] (“[C]onsider what happens to [the odds of school violence]
when you add more guns. For starters, there’s the increased potential for accidents. Even experienced
gun safety instructors make mistakes . . . .”); Tim Walker, Arming Educators—A Bad Idea that Hasn’t
Gone Away, NEATODAY (Jan. 16, 2014, 12:49 PM), http://neatoday.org/2014/01/16/arming-educatorsa-bad-idea-that-hasnt-gone-away/ [http://perma.cc/D4L5-XZSS] (remarking upon a school board
hearing in Idaho that took up the issue of whether to arm school employees as highly concerned with
“[t]he potential for an accident or a misjudgement”).
127
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c04(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.)
(requiring only eight hours of firearms training); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-505.5 (West, Westlaw
through 2014 Gen. Sess.) (requiring no training).
128
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 45-30-103(d) (Westlaw through Mar. 1, 2015) (“[A] volunteer shall
receive any training deemed necessary by the sheriff . . . .”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-40-102(21) (West,
Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (providing definition of “[p]rivate security officer”); 2014 GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-11-130.1(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (“[T]raining shall at a
minimum include training on judgment pistol shooting, marksmanship, and a review of current laws
relating to the use of force for the defense of self and others . . . .”).
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extensive field experience/training and a law enforcement officer’s
effectiveness in responding to a live-shooter event is instructive.129
i. Potential for Misfiring
Despite undergoing extensive training, there remains a high rate of
shooting inaccuracy amongst police officers in live-shooter events—with
the percentage of missed shots ranging between 52%130 and 82%.131 In yet
another study, the International Association of Chiefs of Police examined
all shooting incidents in thirty-five American cities from 1987–1996 to
determine police accuracy rates.132 The study revealed that 65% of police
officers’ shots missed their intended target.133 Of course, as the rate of
shooting inaccuracy increases, so does the rate of bystander injuries and
deaths as people are caught in the crossfire.134
Where the rate of shooting error for police officers is between 52%–
82%, imagine the rate of error for gun-toting teachers with much less or no
training at all.135 Indeed, there is a high probability that the misfiring rate
129
See, e.g., Michael T. Charles & Anne G. Copay, Acquisition of Marksmanship and Gun
Handling Skills Through Basic Law Enforcement Training in an American Police Department, 5 INT’L
J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 16, 29 (2003) (concluding that “students significantly improved their
marksmanship and gun handling skills as a result of the firearms course”).
130
Id. at 17. This Illinois study showed that from 1995 to 1997, the State of Illinois studied a
group of 216 police recruits (185 males, 31 females) with little to no firearm experience or training. Id.
at 16. The recruits were administered a firearms pre-test in areas of marksmanship and gun handling,
fifty hours of firearms training, and then a firearms post-test in the same areas. Id. at 17, 20. In the pretest, the recruits performed poorly in both marksmanship and gun handling. Id. at 22. After the training,
however, the recruits scored significantly higher on their post-test. Id. at 21. In that same time frame, a
review of a sample of police officers’ shooting statistics in the line of duty showed that 52% of all total
shots missed the intended target, while 34% resulted in injury of the target, and 14% of shots resulted
in death of the target. Id. at 17. Moreover, from 1987–1996, 696 police officers were feloniously killed
in the United States, and 91.5% of those officers were killed by firearms. Id. at 16–17.
131
BERNARD D. ROSTKER ET AL., RAND CTR. ON QUALITY POLICING, EVALUATION OF THE NEW
YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT FIREARM TRAINING AND FIREARM-DISCHARGE REVIEW PROCESS 14
(2008), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/RAND_FirearmEvaluation
.pdf [http://perma.cc/8HDW-53A3].
132
Charles & Copay, supra note 129, at 16–17.
133
Id. at 17.
134
See generally Garen J. Wintemute et al., Epidemiology and Clinical Aspects of Stray Bullet
Shootings in the United States, 73 J. TRAUMA & ACUTE CARE SURGERY 215, 219 (2012) (discussing
stray bullet shooting victims). In New York alone, the total number of bystander shooting incidents
doubled between 1983 and 1988—with the number of bystanders killed tripling and the number of
bystanders injured quintupling during the same period. Paul J. Arougheti, Imposing Homicide Liability
on Gun Battle Participants for the Deaths of Innocent Bystanders, 27 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 467,
470 (1994). “Bystanders accounted for approximately nine percent of all shooting victims in New York
in 1991, and about six percent in both 1992 and 1993.” Id. More recently, nine bystanders were
wounded by shots fired by police officers during a confrontation with a lone gunman in New York.
NYPD: 9 Shooting Bystander Victims Hit by Police Gunfire, FOX NEWS (Aug. 25, 2012),
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/08/25/nypd-shooting-bystander-victims-hit-by-police-gunfire/ [http:/
/perma.cc/LC6V-52MY].
135
See supra text accompanying notes 16–17 (discussing the likelihood that teachers would
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for armed teachers is even greater than the 52%–82% rate for trained
officers. This is especially true if the required training for armed teachers
does not include exercises with moving targets and reality-based
simulations.
ii. Ability to Translate Learned Skill into Action
Even when teachers receive training in an effort to reduce shooting
inaccuracy, it remains questionable whether full-time teachers serving as
part-time security guards can safely translate skills learned during training
into action during an actual live-shooter event. A Michigan study
examined the inherent benefit of reality-based training in preparing armed
officers to respond more effectively in live-shooter situations.136
Specifically, it considered which of two widely used shooting stances
officers employed after receiving extensive training at the firing range in
one particular stance.137 The study revealed that officers used a different
stance than the one they were taught to use at the firing range.138 These
results indicate that even the vast majority of highly trained police officers
abandon learned skills and knowledge when involved in a live-shooter
situation.139

perform worse than trained police officers in an active-shooter situation). The training requirements for
federal and state law enforcement officers provides guidance in determining what is a reasonable
amount of training required before teachers are allowed to carry arms in schools. Federal agents serving
in the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives are required to complete 100 hours of
firearms training. Training for ATFE Agents, FEDERALLAWENFORCEMENT.ORG, http://www.federallaw
enforcement.org/atf/atf-training/ [http://perma.cc/7ZNC-Z8HX] (last visited June 27, 2015). United
States Air Marshals are required to complete 155 hours of firearms training. Training for the Federal
Air Marshal Service, FEDERALLAWENFORCEMENT.ORG, http://www.federallawenforcement.org/airmarshal/air-marshal-training/ [http://perma.cc/T6ZU-F7T4] (last visited June 27, 2015). United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents must complete a twenty-two-week training program,
including firearms training. Training for Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agents, FEDERALLAW
ENFORCEMENT.ORG, http://www.federallawenforcement.org/ice/ice-training/ [http://perma.cc/P5KB6B3J] (last visited June 27, 2015). Secret Service agents must complete twenty-eight weeks of general
training, including live-fire training and other firearms training programs. Training for Secret Service
Agents, FEDERALLAWENFORCEMENT.ORG, http://www.federallawenforcement.org/secret-service/secret
-service-training/ [http://perma.cc/M2AE-EZJV] (last visited June 27, 2015). United States Marshals
must complete 17.5 weeks of general training, including firearms training. Basic Training Academy,
U.S. MARSHALS SERV., http://www.usmarshals.gov/careers/trainingacademy.html [http://perma.cc/
GF3R-PGLL] (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).
136
See JOHN A. SEIBEL, REALITY-BASED TRAINING: SKILL DEVELOPMENT IN SURVIVAL STRESS
RESPONSES 8–9 (n.d.), http://www.emich.edu/cerns/downloads/papers/PoliceStaff/Training/REALITYBASED%20TRAINING--Skill%20Development%20in%20Survival%20Stress%20Responses.pdf
[http://perma.cc/N9EW-JCXY] (explaining the Westmoreland study).
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
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iii. Need for Better Training: Quantity and Quality
To be adequately prepared to respond during a live-shooter event, first
responders must understand much more than how to point and shoot in
static situations.140 First responders must also understand when it is
appropriate to pull the trigger and when they should stand down, how to
minimize the natural bodily psychosomatic responses that occur during a
traumatic event, and how to safely ensure that no innocent bystanders are
injured in the crossfire.141 None of these essential skills are taught in a
basic firearms handling course or even during shooting rounds at a firing
range.142
One study indicated that the human body’s fight-or-flight response
provides another obstacle to first responders during a live-shooter event.143
An analysis of World War II and FBI studies demonstrates that humans
possess a natural resistance to killing other humans.144 The body’s natural
“fight or flight” response endangers even the most highly trained police
officers. Indeed, in 1998–2000, out of 148 police officers killed in the line
of duty, 84.5% of them never fired a shot at their killer.145 To combat this
problem, military and law enforcement organizations have begun to
incentivize good marksmanship scores in training.146
“No matter how well we are trained to a stimulus/response; [sic] our
brains are hardwired to override those trained responses by a more
140
See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FIRST RESPONDER GUIDE FOR IMPROVING
SURVIVABILITY IN IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE AND/OR ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS (2015),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/First%20Responder%20Guidance%20June%20201
5%20FINAL%202.pdf [http://perma.cc/3H8Q-YP3T]; POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, THE POLICE
RESPONSE TO ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS 3–6 (2014), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/
Critical_Issues_Series/the%20police%20response%20to%20active%20shooter%20incidents%202014.
pdf [http://perma.cc/4XDW-4WAF] (discussing the numerous obstacles involved in responding to a
live-shooter event, including gaining entry to a building in which a live shooter has sought protection,
coordinating medical care, and using techniques to disable a live shooter outdoors).
141
Id.
142
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-12-203(h) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg.
Sess.) (providing that although one must obtain a training certificate from a handgun training course in
order to obtain a permit, “the applicant shall have discretion in selecting which handgun training class
to complete”).
143
See Active Shooter Training and the OODALoop Theory, CGPGMG (Nov. 23, 2014),
http://cgpgmg.com/active-shooter-training-and-the-oodaloop-theory/
[http://perma.cc/X8Y5-PB8W]
(explaining that, at the time he starts shooting, an active shooter is already three steps ahead of potential
victims in the “Observing, Orienting, Deciding, Acting” Loop, and thus the shooter does not have to
initially deal with the fight-or-flight reaction, putting him at a major strategic advantage).
144
See SEIBEL, supra note 136, at 10 (discussing research noting that, during WWII, only
15%–20% of American riflemen fired upon exposed enemy soldiers with their individual weapons).
145
Id. at 11.
146
Id. at 10–11. Perhaps, schools using armed teachers should provide a similar incentive system
for teachers with good marksmanship. Teachers are already evaluated on their teaching effectiveness,
so if schools ask teachers to assume an additional role as a security guard, where the stakes are so high,
they should also be evaluated on their effectiveness as a security guard.
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powerful ‘instinctual’ response in survival skills.” When exposed to
trauma, the human body, as a visceral response to the fear of death,
becomes “the most clumsiest.”148 It releases anxiety hormones, including
adrenaline, and the heart rate rapidly increases, decreasing the body’s
ability to successfully carry out both complex and fine motor skills, like
unlocking and loading a gun and pointing and shooting.149 Indeed, when
the heart rate rises to over 145 beats per minute (BPM), the body’s ability
to successfully perform any task, including critical survival skills requiring
good hand-eye coordination and the ability to rely on small muscles or a
series of muscles, decreases exponentially.150 Similarly, when the
sympathetic nervous system is activated, it sends the heart rate from its
normal 60–80 BPM to well over 200 BPM within seconds.151 At “a heart
rate over 175 BPM . . . [even the well-trained] officer may experience . . .
irrational behavior such as ‘freezing in place,’ becoming submissive, or
passive.”152
Police officers and experienced security guards, who are in the field on
a daily basis and whose training is of a greater quantity and quality than
that of armed teachers, are better able to manage the body’s natural
responses to trauma because they have more routine exposure to high
trauma events. But when the body’s natural “fight or flight” response is
activated, even trained police officers can abandon their training. It is
therefore unlikely that inadequately trained (or, in some cases, untrained)
teachers will effectively respond during a live-shooter event simply
because they are carrying a firearm. To the contrary, the statistics
demonstrate that arming teachers will make schools more dangerous.
The collective research indicates that, without receiving
comprehensive training and experience in each of the aforementioned
categories, gun-toting teachers bring a new danger onto campus. But state
laws that authorize armed-teacher policies generally do not dictate training
of sufficient quantity and quality. In fact, some states do not even specify a
minimum number of training hours,153 and those states that do require only
minimal training in basic gun handling and fixed-target shooting.154

147

Id. at 14.
Id. at 6.
149
Id. at 6, 16.
150
Id. at 16.
151
Id. at 17.
152
Id. at 21.
153
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.370 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (stating
the requirements for individuals who can possess firearms on school property).
154
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-12-203 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.)
(stating that the only training required to obtain a concealed carry permit is a training certificate from a
handgun training class obtained within the ten years preceding submittal of the application).
148
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The potential for accidental shootings by teachers on school campuses
is a real threat and has occurred tragically in recent incidents in New York
and Ohio.155 Where professionally trained police officers are effective only
18%–48% of the time, it follows that minimally trained teachers with guns
will be less effective, putting students at a higher risk of injury from a
misfired bullet.
b. Scenario B: Misuse of Guns
Not only may teachers accidentally shoot students due to a lack of
appropriate training and experience, but there is also at least a slight risk
that they may misuse a weapon in a moment of frustration or rage.156 In
2010, a University of Alabama biology professor brought a gun to campus.
The professor shot and killed three faculty members and injured three

155
See Kieran Crowely, Packin’ Prof Pulls a ‘Plax’, N.Y. POST (Nov. 18, 2011),
http://nypost.com/2011/11/18/packin-prof-pulls-a-plax/ [http://perma.cc/9U5Y-44EL] (reporting that a
former New York City law enforcement officer and criminal justice professor at Long Island
University stepped out of a classroom to secure his gun when he accidentally discharged the firearm
and shot himself in the leg); Mary Beth Lane, Instructor Shoots Student in Gun-Safety Class,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Aug. 13, 2013, 6:03 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/public/
2013/08/12/concealed-carry-accidental-shooting.html [http://perma.cc/3EZ2-AZNU] (reporting that an
instructor for a gun safety class discharged his gun and shot a twenty-six-year-old student in the arm).
It was later revealed that several years prior to this incident, the instructor accidentally shot a friend of
his daughter while the children were on a haunted hayride. Mary Beth Lane, Accidental Shooting Was
Not First for Firearms Instructor, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Aug. 22, 2013, 7:07 AM),
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/public/2013/08/21/accidental-shooting-was-not-first-for-firear
ms-instructor.html [http://perma.cc/4HPV-YNFP]. He claimed that he wanted to create a “scary effect”
by firing the weapon into the air and thought the gun was loaded with blanks. Id.
156
See Thomas Barrabi, Texas Teacher Punches Student, 12-Year-Old Reginald Wells, After
Beaumont Middle Schooler Made Joke About Favorite Football Team, Report Says, INT’L BUS. TIMES
(Nov. 15, 2013, 9:10 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/texas-teacher-punches-student-12-year-oldreginald-wells-after-beaumont-middle-schooler-made-joke [http://perma.cc/XU49-8C5X] (reporting
that a Texas middle school teacher punched one of his students in the face for making a joke about his
favorite football team); Liz Crawford, Guilford County Teacher Resigns After Allegedly Hitting a
Student, WFMYNEWS (May 21, 2014, 7:41 AM), http://www.wfmynews2.com/story/news/local/2014/
05/20/guilford-county-schools-teacher-resigns-after-allegedly-hitting-student/9349073/ [http://perma.cc
/R6M5-ETCV] (reporting that a math teacher hit an eighth grade student on the head with his knuckles
and then shoved him into a locker and allegedly tried to choke the student); Tara Herrschaft, Teacher
May be Fired for Hitting a Student, WAFB (Oct. 30, 2012, 9:37 PM), http://www.wafb.com/story/1990
4833/teacher-may-be-fired-for-hitting-a-student (reporting that a Georgia schoolteacher may be fired
for hitting a student); Rebecca Klein, Teacher Fired After Using Broom to Break Up Violent Fight,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 8, 2014, 10:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/07/detroitteacher-broom-fight_n_5283324.html [http://perma.cc/EQ64-L9AA] (reporting that a Michigan teacher
was fired after a cell phone video showed her hitting students with a broom in an effort to break up a
fight); John Luciew, Teacher Fired for Allegedly Ordering Six Older Students to Beat Up 7th-Grader
Who Sassed Her, PENNLIVE (Apr. 15, 2014, 9:18 AM), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/
2014/04/teacher_fired_for_allegedly_en.html [http://perma.cc/N6P5-3HRD] (reporting that a Florida
middle school teacher lost her job after instructing some older students to attack a younger student who
disrespected her in class).
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157

others during a faculty meeting. In 2012, a Florida Spanish teacher who
was fired earlier in the day returned to school with a gun and shot and
killed the headmistress and then himself.158 In November 2013, a substitute
teacher at Cheyenne Middle School in Oklahoma interrupted students
during an online test and shouted to the students who were not paying
attention, “[i]f you don’t stop going to that website, I will shoot you and
tell your parents you died by natural causes.”159 Similarly, in Utah,160 New
Jersey,161 and Tennessee,162 teachers at junior high schools have threatened
to shoot students, teachers, and staff.
Further, the United States Department of Education has studied the
frequency of the use of corporal punishment in K-12 schools. According to
a study conducted by the Department, in the 2006–2007 academic year, a
total of 268,684 students were subjected to corporal punishment.163 At least
33,039 of those students were classified as disabled under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.164
157
Eric Schultz, Ex-Professor Guilty of Killing Alabama Colleagues, USA TODAY (Sept. 11,
2012, 4:53 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012/09/11/ex-professor-guilty-ofkilling-alabama-colleagues/57749884/1 [http://perma.cc/4BDT-4R6T].
158
Fla. School Murder-Suicide Shooter Identified as Fired Spanish Teacher Shane Schumerth,
CBS NEWS (Mar. 7, 2012, 1:11 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fla-school-murder-suicide-shooter
-identified-as-fired-spanish-teacher-shane-schumerth/ [http://perma.cc/8VJL-XW87].
159
Michael Seiden, Edmund Substitute Teacher Accused of Threatening to Kill Students,
KOCO.COM (Nov. 8, 2013, 8:25 PM), http://www.koco.com/news/oklahomanews/edmond-substituteteacher-accused-of-threatening-to-kill-students/22880522 [http://perma.cc/M3D5-YMZ8].
160
Teacher Threatens to Bring Gun to School, KSL.COM (May 27, 2004, 2:17 PM), http://www
.ksl.com/?nid=148&sid=84553 [http://perma.cc/8GCA-HB8Z].
161
Jon Offredo, Lawrence Middle School Spanish Teacher Is Accused of Threatening to Shoot
Students in Kneecaps, Police Say, NJ.COM (Oct. 30, 2013, 10:17 PM), http://www.nj.com/mercer/index
.ssf/2013/10/lawrence_teacher_accused_of_threating_to_shoot_middle_school_students_in_kneecaps_
police_say.html [http://perma.cc/6VDB-2N2H].
162
See Howard Portnoy, Teacher Reportedly Threatens Student with Fake Gun, LIBERTY
UNYIELDING (Jan. 10, 2014, 4:32 PM), http://libertyunyielding.com/2014/01/10/teaching-reportedlythreatens-student-fake-gun/ [http://perma.cc/A5UW-2UUQ] (reporting that in a moment of
exasperation, a high school math teacher pointed an imaginary gun at a student and stated, “I wish this
was real”).
163
See 2006 National and State Estimations, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://ocrdata.ed.gov/State
NationalEstimations/Projections_2006 (follow “National Total” hyperlink) (last visited July 30, 2015)
(showing the national estimated total number of students who experienced corporal punishment in
2006, which also includes students with disabilities).
164
Id.; see also Mileka Lincoln, Teacher’s Aide Investigated for Stabbing Student with Pencil,
HAW. NEWS NOW (Feb. 13, 2014, 12:36 AM), http://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/story/24710523/
teachers-aide-investigated-for-stabbing-student-with-pencil (reporting that in Hawaii, a teacher’s aide
stabbed a special education student with a pencil); Teacher Slams Student’s Face into Desk & Throws
Him Against the Wall, REPORTERGARY.COM (May 29, 2013), http://reportergary.com/2013/05/teacherslams-students-face-into-desk-throws-him-against-the-wall/ [http://perma.cc/QDV4-9N6S] (reporting
that a Minnesota teacher grabbed a student involved in a physical altercation with another student,
slammed his face into a desk, and shoved him against a wall); Paul Thompson, Teacher ‘Threw Autistic
Elementary Student into Wall’ After He Hit and Pinched Her, DAILYMAIL.COM (Feb. 25, 2013, 4:51
PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2284418/Jacqueline-Zuniga-Lake-County-Florida-teach
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Teachers today are overworked, and their patience is already running
low.165 Teachers juggle disruptive students, interpersonal student issues
caused by bullying and harassment occurring both in school and on social
media,166 and numerous socio-economic, political, and other systemic
obstacles, making it difficult for students to meet academic benchmarks
upon which teachers are evaluated.167 Thus, the classroom can be a highly
stressful environment. While the potential that a disgruntled teacher would
aim and fire a gun at a problem student is relatively low, it is conceivable
that a teacher could, in a fit of rage, misuse an available weapon.168
Introducing another dangerous variable into an already-stressful
environment invites an unnecessary government-created risk, altering the
status quo and opening the school and its employees up to potentially
avoidable liability.
c. Scenario C: Gun Accessibility to Children and the Risk of GunRelated Accidents
Another known risk invited onto campus by the armed-teacher
approach is the accessibility of inherently dangerous weapons to children,
resulting in a higher probability that gun-related accidents could occur. A
teacher or administrator, who may be inadequately trained in gun handling,

er-arrested-throwing-autistic-boy-wall.html (reporting that a Florida teacher’s aide lost her temper and
picked up an autistic child by his arm and leg, hurling him against the classroom wall, bruising his
head, and causing him to lie motionless for thirty seconds after telling the student, “You hit me, I hit
you”); Bill Turque, Student Injured by Chair-Wielding Sub, WASH. POST (May 18, 2010, 4:53 PM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/dcschools/2010/05/student_injured_by_chair-wield.html [http://perm
a.cc/2J2Q-3JEB] (reporting that a substitute teacher in Washington, D.C. threw a chair at a student,
fracturing the student’s ankle, after the student denied the accusation that he threw jellybeans at the
teacher); Michael Walsh, Kindergarten Teacher Caught on Camera Grabbing 6-Year-Old’s Face, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (May 14, 2014, 2:02 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/kindergartenteacher-caught-camera-grabbing-6-year-old-face-article-1.1792044
[http://perma.cc/X4XT-3LH7]
(reporting that an Ohio teacher grabbed a six-year-old kindergarten student, “pinning him against the
wall and clutching his face”).
165
See Lyndsey Layton, Is the Classroom a Stressful Place? Thousands of Teachers Say Yes,
WASH. POST (May 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/is-the-classroom-astressful-place-thousands-of-teachers-say-yes/2015/05/12/829f56d8-f81b-11e4-9030-b4732caefe81_sto
ry.html [https://perma.cc/PP7C-ZHZZ] (discussing a study finding that “[s]even out of every 10
respondent[] [teachers] said they ‘often’ felt their work is stressful and nearly eight out of 10 indicated
they recently felt physically and mentally exhausted at the end of the work day”).
166
See Danielle Weatherby, From Jack to Jill: Gender Expression as Protected Speech in the
Modern Schoolhouse, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 89, 99 (2015).
167
Helen F. Ladd, Education and Poverty: Confronting the Evidence 9–10, 14–16 (Duke Univ.
Sanford Sch. of Pub. Pol’y, Working Paper SAN11-01, 2011), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED5369
52.pdf [http://perma.cc/NUL7-XUXJ].
168
See Jennifer Frederick, Do As I Say, Not As I Do: Why Teachers Should Not Be Allowed to
Carry Guns on School Property, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 139, 143 (1999) (stating that if teachers were allowed
to carry guns, “schools may run the risk of quick-tempered or trigger-happy teachers taking
inappropriate action in the heat of the moment”).
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storage, or safety, has the potential to inadvertently leave a loaded gun in
an area accessible to children, resulting in the unthinkable.169
The headlines all too often remind us of the inherent danger of storing
firearms in areas that are accessible to children.170 A recent New York
Times review of hundreds of child firearm deaths revealed that “accidental
shootings occurred roughly twice as often as the records indicate.”171 In
fact, “more than half of the 259 accidental firearm deaths of children under
the age of 15 identified by The Times in eight states where records were
available” were also not reported as accidents.172 Therefore, the risk of
accidental killings may be even higher than reflected in the statistics
surrounding the debate over how to protect children from guns.173
Moreover, studies have identified a positive association between the
presence of guns in the home and the risk of unintentional gun-related
injuries and deaths among children and adults.174 These studies foreshadow
169
See, e.g., Andrew J. McClurg, Armed and Dangerous: Tort Liability for the Negligent Storage
of Firearms, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1189, 1202 (2000) (arguing that unsafe firearms storage creates the risk
that unauthorized users will gain access to guns, thereby increasing the risk of accidental shootings,
adolescent suicides, and criminal misuse of stolen guns); Matt Sledge, Arming Teachers, School Cops
Could Cause More Harm than Good, Experts Say, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 20, 2012, 4:56 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/18/arming-teachers-cops-sandy-hook_n_2325727.html [http://
perma.cc/6HEE-G7ER] (discussing criticisms of the movement to place armed police officers in
schools).
170
Antwan Harris, Child Accidentally Shot by Sibling, Killed on Tinsley Place, WRCBTV.COM
(July 14, 2010, 10:56 AM), http://www.wrcbtv.com/story/12792260/update-child-accidentally-shot-bysibling-killed-on-tinsley-place (reporting that a two-year-old girl died after her sibling accidentally shot
her in the chest while playing with a loaded handgun obtained from her parent’s bedroom); Pilar
Pedraza, Funeral Services Set for Toddler Accidentally Shot & Killed, EYEWITNESS NEWS 12 (May 6,
2014, 10:38 AM), http://www.kwch.com/news/local-news/police-investigating-possible-shootinginvolving-child/25719386 [http://perma.cc/W7VH-MEFU] (reporting that a four-year-old accidentally
killed his nineteen-month-old brother after he got hold of a loaded handgun in a nightstand drawer);
Sam Stein, 100 Children Died in Unintentional Shootings in Year After Newtown, HUFFINGTON POST
(June 25, 2014, 6:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/25/child-shooting-deathseverytown_n_5527932.html [http://perma.cc/2R9N-EC2U]; see also Michael Luo & Mike McIntire,
Children and Guns: The Hidden Toll, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
09/29/us/children-and-guns-the-hidden-toll.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (reporting on the devastating
incidents of accidental deaths caused by the accessibility of guns in America).
171
Luo & McIntire, supra note 170.
172
Id. For example, the article describes the gun deaths of three-year-old Lucas Heagren, elevenyear-old Cassie Culpepper, and eleven-year-old Alex Whitfield, who were all accidentally shot by other
children who gained access to firearms. Id. However, all three of these incidents were not recorded as
accidents. Id.
173
Id.
174
See, e.g., John R. Martin et al., Accidental Firearm Fatalities Among New Mexico Children, 20
ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 58, 59−60 (1991) (finding that the twenty-five unintentional firearm
fatalities identified in the study occurred most frequently among children playing with loaded guns
obtained from a residence); Douglas J. Wiebe, Firearms in U.S. Homes as a Risk Factor for
Unintentional Gunshot Fatality, 35 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 711, 713 (2003) (“[T]he
relative risk of death by an unintentional shooting, comparing subjects living in homes with and
without at least one gun, was 3.7.”).
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the potential for an increase in gun-related injuries to students should
teachers be allowed to carry guns in school, especially given the propensity
for even trained security officers to misplace their guns.175
For these reasons, the creation and implementation of a policy
allowing teachers to carry firearms on a public school campus is an
affirmative act, distinguishable from passive inaction, which alters the
status quo and heightens the risk that a student will suffer a gun-related
injury on campus.176 Schools utilizing the armed-teachers approach are
therefore throwing students into the “snake pit” and opening themselves up
to unnecessary liability.
2. Plaintiff Is a Member of a Discrete Class
The second element of a state-created danger claim requires that the
plaintiff be a member of a limited and specifically identifiable group.177 In
other words, “the state’s actions [must] place the victim specifically at risk,
as distinguished from a risk that affects the public at large.”178
In McQueen v. Beecher Community Schools,179 five children were left
in a classroom with an armed classmate.180 The court held that the five
children were especially at risk, as the shooter was “much more likely to
shoot the students in his immediate physical presence than a member of the
general public.”181 The McQueen court rejected the counterarguments that
(1) the perpetrator could have walked out of the classroom and fired at
175
See Elementary School Guard Asked to Not Come Back After 5th-Grader Takes Gun from His
Holster, FOX NEWS (May 13, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/05/13/elementary-school-guard
-asked-to-not-come-back-after-5th-grader-takes-gun-from/ [http://perma.cc/YS5V-59MR]; Holyoke
Officer Punished for Misplacing Gun, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 13, 2014, 11:00 AM),
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2014/Holyoke_officer_punished_for_misplacing_gun/id-e50fbe6b3b3
a4cbbb59ee74b706d6980 [http://perma.cc/R5EW-528V]; Marion High SRO Suspended After Losing
Gun, WBTW NEWS 13 (Oct. 6, 2010, 1:26 PM), http://www.wbtw.com/story/21042925/marion-highsro-suspended-after-losing-gun; Vignesh Ramachandran, School Security Guard in Michigan Leaves
Gun in Bathroom, Officials Say, NBC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2015, 6:10 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews
.com/_news/2013/01/18/16590086-school-security-guard-in-michigan-leaves-gun-in-bathroom-official
s-say [http://perma.cc/MK8Q-33PA]; School Guard Loses Gun; Policy Reviewed, REGISTER-GUARD
(Sept. 21, 2011), http://projects.registerguard.com/turin/2011/sep/21/school-guard-loses-gun-policyreviewed/ [http://perma.cc/VV6T-RBDP].
176
See supra Part IV.B.1.
177
See Castaldo v. Stone, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1172 (D. Colo. 2001) (stating that in order for
plaintiffs to successfully plead a state-created danger claim, they must prove that the victims of the
shooting—Columbine High School students—were members of a limited and specifically identifiable
group).
178
See Jones v. Reynolds, 438 F.3d 685, 696 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that to satisfy the second
element of the state-created danger doctrine, the state’s actions must place the plaintiff “specifically at
risk, as distinguished from a risk that affects the public at large” (quoting Kallstrom v. City of
Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir. 1998))).
179
433 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 2006).
180
Id. at 468.
181
Id.
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students in the hallways, and (2) that the general public was also at risk
because the shooter could have walked off school property, or because
shots fired within the school could have passed through walls and windows
and injured someone outside.182 With regard to the first counterargument,
the court stated that even “if the relevant group [of plaintiffs] included
everyone in the school, the special danger requirement still would be
satisfied” because the shooter “was much more likely to shoot the students
in his immediate physical presence than a member of the general
public.”183 Further, while recognizing the possibility that a member of the
public could be injured, the court rejected the second counterargument and
held that the risks faced by the public were collateral to and smaller than
the risks faced by the five students in the classroom.184
When a teacher brings a gun to school pursuant to an armed-teachers
policy, the school environment is altered and students are placed at an
increased risk of harm. Because this risk includes misfiring during a liveshooter event or injury caused by a misplaced gun on campus, the class of
potential plaintiffs undoubtedly includes those students of the particular
school at which the armed-teacher works. When weapons are brought onto
campus, a student’s mere physical presence on campus automatically
classifies her as a member of a limited and specifically identifiable group
that is placed at a higher risk than that faced by members of the public at
large. As such, a student at a school with an armed-teachers policy would
certainly satisfy the “discrete class” element of the state-created danger
doctrine.
3. Proximate Cause and Foreseeability
The third element of a constitutional claim predicated on a statecreated danger theory requires that the state actor’s affirmative act be the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s harm.185 Determining whether an act was
the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s harm is based on the foreseeability of
the plaintiff’s injury.186 An injury is foreseeable when an actor is aware “of
a risk of harm to an individual or class of individuals such that the actor is
on notice that his or her act or failure to act significantly enhances that risk
of harm.”187 In Sciotto v. Marple Newton School District,188 where a high
school invited onto campus heavier and more experienced alumni wrestlers
182

Id.
Id.
184
Id.
185
King v. E. St. Louis Sch. Dist. 189, 496 F.3d 812, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2007).
186
See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1209 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding proximate cause where
police officer put plaintiff in danger of foreseeable injury by sending plaintiff home unescorted in a
visibly intoxicated state in cold weather).
187
Gremo v. Karlin, 363 F. Supp. 2d 771, 784 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
188
81 F. Supp. 2d 559 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
183
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to “live wrestle” student wrestlers, the court held that a reasonable jury
could find that injury was foreseeable.189 The record revealed that parents
had expressed safety concerns and that an expert testified that the situation
was an “accident waiting to happen.”190
Similarly, in Hillard v. Lampeter-Strasburg School District,191 the
court held that a student’s brain injuries sustained during a physical
education class exercise called “Fly on the Wall” were reasonably
foreseeable.192 Fly on the Wall required a student “fly” to stand on a chair
against the wall while other students taped her to the wall with duct tape.193
Plaintiff volunteered to be a fly, and, while standing on the chair against
the wall, lost her footing, fell to the floor, and hit her head.194 She suffered
temporal and occipital bone fractures, had two brain surgeries, and was on
life support for seven days.195 In determining that the injury was
foreseeable, the court relied on the fact that the risks associated with the
Fly on the Wall exercise had been previously reported to the school by a
former student who choked during the exercise a year earlier.196 Since it
was reasonable to conclude that taping a person to a wall above a concrete
floor could result in injury, the court found that proximate cause was easily
established.197
In the absence of actual notice, injuries may be reasonably foreseeable
based on a totality of the circumstances analysis.198 In Kneipp v. Tedder,199
four police officers stopped a husband and wife for causing a disturbance
in the street.200 After questioning the couple and observing that the wife
was so intoxicated that she could not walk without support, the police
released the husband so that he could go home and relieve the babysitter.201

189

Id. at 564–65.
Id.
191
No. Civ. A. 03-2198, 2004 WL 1091050 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 2014).
192
Id. at *3.
193
Id. at *1.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id. at *3.
197
Id.
198
See id. (concluding that a jury could find that the superintendent and school district should
have known that a certain physical education activity created a foreseeable risk of injury where parents
had made earlier complaints about the activity restricting their child’s breathing); Sciotto v. Marple
Newton Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 559, 564–65 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (concluding that a jury could find that a
wrestling coach and athletic director should have known that the practice of inviting older alumni
wrestlers to wrestle high school students created a foreseeable risk of injury where expert opined about
dangerousness of such practice, parents had complained about such practice, and relevant rules
addressed such practice).
199
95 F.3d 1199 (3d Cir. 1996).
200
Id. at 1201.
201
Id. at 1201–02.
190
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Subsequently, the police sent the wife home alone without an escort.202
Two hours later, she was found at the bottom of an embankment where she
had suffered hypothermia and severe brain damage.203
In concluding that the wife’s injuries were reasonably foreseeable, the
court considered the totality of the circumstances.204 In particular, the court
emphasized the fact that the wife’s blood alcohol level was 0.25%, that it
was a particularly cold evening, and that the husband testified that he had
to assist his wife and even carry her at times because she could not support
herself.205 Based on these facts, the court concluded that a jury could find
that the wife’s injuries were more likely to occur because of the police
officers’ actions in sending an obviously-intoxicated woman home
alone.206
The hallmark of a § 1983 claim turns on whether the events that caused
the plaintiff’s injuries were reasonably foreseeable in light of the
defendant’s actions.207 “[T]he requisite causal chain can occur through the
‘setting in motion [of] a series of acts by others which the actor knows or
reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional
injury.’”208 Each foreseeability analysis turns on the unique facts and
circumstances of that particular case.209
When teachers bring firearms onto K-12 school campuses, there are
many potential ways in which students could suffer harm. First, an
inadequately trained teacher could accidentally shoot a student.210 When
teachers are armed and ready to respond to a live-shooter event, there is the
potential that they may be more likely to engage an active shooter when an
adequately-trained law enforcement officer would otherwise not.211 In that
case, students are more likely to become caught in the crossfire, dodging
not only one shooter’s stray bullets, but those of potentially two or more
202

Id. at 1202.
Id. at 1203.
204
Id. at 1208, 1211.
205
Id. at 1208.
206
Id.
207
See Gremo v. Karlin, 363 F. Supp. 2d 771, 784 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (“[A] harm is foreseeable
when a state actor has actual awareness, based on concrete information, of a risk of harm to an
individual or class of individuals such that the actor is on notice that his or her act or failure to act
significantly enhances that risk of harm.”).
208
Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d
740, 743–44 (9th Cir. 1978)).
209
See, e.g., Semler v. Psychiatric Inst. of Wash., D.C., 538 F.2d 121, 124–25 (4th Cir. 1976)
(analyzing foreseeability of danger created by releasing a psychiatric patient from an institution through
the particular facts of the patient’s background and medical history).
210
See supra Part IV(B)(1)(a)(i) (discussing data indicating greater likelihood of shooting
inaccuracy during a live-shooter event).
211
See supra Part IV(B)(1)(a)(iii) (discussing literature indicating the difficulty a first-time
responder in a live-shooter event would encounter in trying to quell the body’s natural “flight or fight”
response so as to respond effectively in the situation).
203
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inadequately trained teachers. There is also the potential that a teacher
could misuse a firearm in a moment of rage.212 Finally, the mere presence
of additional firearms on campus, especially when in the possession of
untrained teachers, increases the accessibility of weapons to students. With
guns easily accessible, a number of unthinkable hypotheticals could place
schoolchildren in unnecessary danger.213
In light of the data linking improper gun use to gun-related accidents
and deaths,214 school officials should—at the very least—be on
constructive notice of the enhanced risk of the armed-teacher approach.
Moreover, school districts attempting to implement this approach have
been met with significant resistance. Superintendents,215 law enforcement
officers,216 educators,217 and even the President of National School Safety
and Security Services218 oppose the armed-teachers approach and have
expressed impassioned pleas to states and local school boards considering
212
See supra notes 156–62 and accompanying text (compiling instances in which teachers
threatened violence or use of firearms against fellow faculty or students or actually committed violence
or used firearms to harm other faculty or students on school grounds).
213
See supra note 170 (compiling tragic news stories concerning the accidental deaths of young
children due to negligent storage of firearms).
214
See supra Part IV(B)(1) (discussing studies and anecdotal evidence linking accidental gun
injuries and death to misuse of firearms and increased accessibility of guns to children).
215
Kevin R. Jenkins, Area Superintendents Against Arming Teachers, DAILY J. ONLINE (Jan. 23,
2013, 5:24 AM), http://dailyjournalonline.com/news/local/area-superintendents-against-armingteachers/article_2f89a0d6-654f-11e2-9096-0019bb2963f4.html
[http://perma.cc/JY23-9L2G]
(reporting that prior to the consideration of Missouri House Bill 70 that would authorize teachers to
carry firearms on campus, Dr. Desi Mayberry, a Missouri superintendent, expressed concern “about
arming people with no training . . . . [as] [t]he potential for an accident involving a student would be
something we’d want to avoid”); id. (reporting that another Missouri superintendent stated: “I see more
potential negatives than positives in this. There is a greater chance of accidental shootings. With more
guns, the chance goes way up”); id. (reporting that another superintendent stated: “We’re very
concerned about the training of any teacher who would be carrying a gun on school grounds. We’re
also concerned about accidental shootings”).
216
James Pinkerton, Teachers as First Line of Defense?; Many in Law Enforcement See It as a
Dangerous Idea, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 21, 2013, at A1 (reporting that the Houston Police Chief
expressed concern that “[i]f we give teachers handguns, are we going to give them bulletproof vests to
go with them, are we going to give them ballistic helmets? I just don’t think it’s a good idea”); id.
(reporting that the Pasadena Police Chief was concerned “about accidents that could occur when
children are around firearms” and said that “there are more downsides than pluses”).
217
See Laura Zuckerman, Utah Teachers Get Free Gun Training in Response to Newtown
Shooting, REUTERS (Dec. 27, 2012, 9:52 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/28/us-usa-gunsteachers-idUSBRE8BR02N20121228 [http://perma.cc/PY9D-ADZG] (discussing how one teacher
feels it would pose a safety risk if “a disgruntled student could overpower [her] and take [the gun]”).
218
See Arming Teachers and School Staff, NAT’L SCH. SAFETY & SEC. SERVS. (July 24, 2015),
http://www.schoolsecurity.org/trends/arming-teachers-and-school-staff/ [http://perma.cc/N8X7-H7F8]
(discussing the statements of Kenneth Trump, President of National School Safety and Security
Services, who stated that “it is short-sighted for those supporting the idea to believe that educators who
enter a profession to teach and serve a supportive, nurturing role with children could abruptly kick into
the mindset to kill someone in a second’s notice. Police officers train their entire career and enter each
traffic stop and individual encounter with a preparedness and life-safety mindset that is different from
the professional training and mindset of educators”).
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219

such an approach. Voiced complaints, coupled with the data suggesting
that armed-teachers will be ineffective during a live-shooter event, put
schools “on actual notice” of the safety concerns inherent in the armedteachers approach.220
In short, allowing K-12 teachers to carry firearms on campus without
proper training is an “accident waiting to happen.”221 In light of the
overwhelming evidence supporting this opinion and the actual complaints
and concerns voiced by opponents of such an approach, school districts
and school employees implementing the armed-teachers approach should
be deemed “on notice” of the multiple foreseeable risks to students. Where
the risks associated with the armed-teacher approach are reasonably
foreseeable and school districts have been put on actual notice of the
potential harm, a plaintiff claiming liability against the school for injuries
sustained as a result of the armed-teacher approach should easily satisfy
the proximate cause element of a state-created danger claim.
4. Defendant’s Conduct Shocks the Conscience
The fourth and most challenging element of the state-created danger
exception asks whether the state actor’s behavior shocks the conscience.222
This element requires that an “official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.”223 Furthermore, conduct that
shocks the conscience in one environment “may not be so patently
egregious in another, and [the Court’s] concern with preserving the
219
Americans generally do not support the armed-teachers approach. See PEW RESEARCH CTR.,
IN GUN CONTROL DEBATE, SEVERAL OPTIONS DRAW MAJORITY SUPPORT 1 (2013),
http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/01-14-13%20Gun%20Policy%20Release.pdf [http://per
ma.cc/CW23-EG5A] (finding that 57% of the 1502 Americans surveyed are against the idea of arming
teachers); WINTHROP UNIV., FEBRUARY 2013 WINTHROP POLL tbl. 39 (2013) (finding that two-thirds
of the 1038 South Carolinians surveyed are opposed to arming teachers in schools).
220
Arming Teachers and School Staff, NAT’L SCH. SAFETY & SEC. SERVS. (July 24, 2015),
http://www.schoolsecurity.org/trends/arming-teachers-and-school-staff/ [http://perma.cc/N8X7-H7F8];
see also Gremo v. Karlin, 363 F. Supp. 2d 771, 784 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (“[A] harm is foreseeable when a
state actor has actual awareness, based on concrete information, of a risk of harm to an individual or
class of individuals such that the actor is on notice that his or her act or failure to act significantly
enhances that risk of harm.”); Sciotto v. Marple Newton Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 559, 565 (E.D. Pa.
1999) (“[A] reasonable jury could find—on the basis of expert observations on the dangerousness of
the tradition of inviting alumni to wrestling practices, a prior injury under similar circumstances,
parental complaints about the safety of the practice, and relevant rules governing high school
athletics—that inviting older, heavier, more experienced alumni wrestlers to practice with the Marple
Newtown High School wrestling squad and . . . to ‘live wrestle’ with younger, lighter, less experienced
members of the high school team . . . created a foreseeable risk of injury, and that a reasonable
wrestling coach and athletic director knowing of such a practice, could have foreseen an injury . . . .”).
221
Sciotto, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 564.
222
King v. E. St. Louis Sch. Dist. 189, 496 F.3d 812, 818 (7th Cir. 2007).
223
Hart v. City of Little Rock, 432 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 837 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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constitutional proportions of substantive due process demands an exact
analysis of circumstances before any abuse of power is condemned as
conscience shocking.”224
“[W]hat is required to meet the conscience-shocking level will depend
upon the circumstances of each case, particularly the extent to which
deliberation is possible.”225 Indeed, there is a continuum upon which the
degree of culpability required for a state-created danger claim is
measured.226 The level of culpability is inversely related to the amount of
time the government actors had to respond to a particular incident. “The
level of culpability required to shock the conscience increases as the time
state actors have to deliberate decreases.”227 Historically, “[w]here state
officials are asked to make split-second decisions in ‘a hyperpressurized
environment,’ an intent to cause harm is usually required.”228 Conversely,
“where officials are afforded the luxury of a greater degree of deliberation
and have time to make ‘unhurried judgments,’” conduct demonstrating
deliberate indifference is sufficient to establish conduct that shocks the
conscience.229 Moreover, where the state actor is forced to “make
something less exigent than a ‘split-second decision, but more urgent than
an ‘unhurried judgment,’” the court considers whether the defendant
“disregarded a great risk of serious harm rather than a substantial risk.”230
Thus, in the Third Circuit, the three standards governing the shocksthe-conscience inquiry are: (1) deliberate indifference, where the state
actor has ample time to deliberate; (2) gross negligence or arbitrariness that
shocks the conscience—which requires that the state actor consciously
disregard a great risk of serious harm—where the state actor must act
within a matter of minutes or hours;231 or (3) intent to cause harm, where
the state actor makes a split-second decision.232
In unique situations where the government intervenes in anticipation of
an emergency and, due to its intervention, creates a more dangerous
situation, courts have been more willing to find that the behavior was
conscience-shocking. For example, the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey in Van Orden v. Borough of Woodstown233 stated that the
defendant borough’s actions could be considered conscience shocking
224

County of Sacramento v. Estate of Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998).
Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 310 (3d Cir. 2006).
226
Id. at 310.
227
Id.
228
Van Orden v. Borough of Woodstown, 5 F. Supp. 3d 676, 683 (D.N.J. 2014) (quoting Walter
v. Pike County, 544 F.3d 182, 192 (3d Cir. 2008)).
229
Id. at 683 (citing Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 240 (3rd Cir. 2008)).
230
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 241 (quoting Sanford, 456 F.3d at 306).
231
Id.
232
McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Schs., 433 F.3d 460, 469 (6th Cir. 2006).
233
5 F. Supp. 3d 676 (D.N.J. 2014).
225
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because it failed to close Route 40, a main road near a dam, after opening
the dam’s floodgates to control flood waters during Hurricane Irene.234 The
plaintiff’s daughter, whose home had lost power during the hurricane, was
driving on Route 40 to escape from the storm when her car was “‘swept
away by fast-moving water,’” resulting in her drowning.235 After finding
that the defendants’ affirmative acts—the opening of the floodgates, which
caused Route 40 to become “‘inundated with raging flood waters’”—was
the but-for cause of the plaintiff’s daughter’s death, the court turned its
attention to the conscience-shocking inquiry.236
Highlighting the Third Circuit’s approach in developing varying
degrees of culpability in light of the exigency of the situation, the Van
Orden court rejected the Defendants’ argument that the highest level of
culpability should govern since, according to the Defendants, the decision
to open the dam and the simultaneous failure to close Route 40 was in
response to “‘an ever-changing emergency situation’” and a “‘hyperpressurized’ situation.”237 Instead, the court relied on facts from the record
indicating that the “[d]efendants had at least several hours ‘to prepare
and/or implement a plan for dealing with the storm’s potential effects,’
before opening the floodgates ‘later [t]hat evening’” and held that Plaintiff
did not have to prove actual intent to harm.238 Ultimately, the court held
that “[r]eleasing ‘raging flood water’ capable of enveloping roads and
bridges and causing serious bodily injury or death, without taking safety
measures to protect citizens, certainly could be considered conduct that
shocks the conscience.”239
Following the Third Circuit’s analytical framework, a school shooting
victim claiming that school actors are liable for the injuries under a statecreated danger theory must first address whether a claim premised on a
teacher’s (1) misfiring, (2) misuse, or (3) misplacement of the gun resulted
from a split-second decision.
Where the but-for cause of the plaintiff’s injuries is the teacher’s act of
misfiring a gun, such a claim, without more, would probably not rise to the
“conscience-shocking” level sufficient to hold individual actors liable,
especially in circuits that differentiate between split-second decisions and
decisions that allow for reasoned deliberation. A teacher’s act of pulling
the trigger (and missing due to inadequate training) is likely a split-second
decision made during a traumatic event that will not satisfy the intent-toharm standard, especially where the teacher’s presumed intent in firing the
234

Id. at 684.
Id. at 679.
236
Id. at 682, 684.
237
Id. at 683–84.
238
Id.
239
Id. at 684.
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weapon at an attacker was to protect her students. Ultimately, the analysis
will depend on the number of students in the teacher’s nearby vicinity, the
teacher’s experience level, and other contributing factors unique to the
particular case.
To satisfy the conscience-shocking element in “settings [that] provide
the opportunity for reflection and unhurried judgments,” the appropriate
standard is that of deliberate indifference.240 Where a teacher left six
students in a classroom as punishment for not doing their work, the court
held that “deliberate indifference is the appropriate standard because [the
teacher] had the opportunity to reflect and to deliberate before deciding to
leave [the children] unsupervised in the classroom[,] . . . . [and] did not
need to make a split-second decision that merits applying a higher
standard.”241 Similarly, where the victim’s injury is proximately caused by
a teacher’s misplacement of her gun, deliberate indifference would be the
appropriate standard, as the misplacement was likely not a split-second
decision made under stressful and chaotic circumstances.
In proving “deliberate indifference” based on a teacher’s misplacement
of a gun, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the official was both “aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists,” and that the teacher drew the inference.242 A teacher’s
act of leaving a gun in an accessible area in a school full of children
probably constitutes deliberate indifference since the chance that a student
could find the misplaced gun and actually injure herself or others is
great.243
Finally, a plaintiff’s claim premised upon a teacher’s misuse of a gun
would easily satisfy the shocks-the-conscience inquiry, even applying the
burdensome split-second-decision standard of “intent to harm.” Under any
conceivable circumstance in which a teacher misused a weapon for
punitive, intimidation, or other inappropriate purposes, the teacher
undoubtedly had actual intent to harm.
“It should not be surprising that the constitutional concept of
conscience shocking duplicates no traditional category of common-law
fault, but rather points clearly away from liability, or clearly toward it, only
at the ends of the tort law’s spectrum of culpability.”244 Generally, garden-

240
McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Schs., 433 F.3d 460, 469 (6th Cir. 2006) (alteration in original)
(quoting Bukowski v. City of Akron, 326 F.3d 702, 710 (6th Cir. 2003)).
241
Id.
242
Id. (quoting Sperle v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 297 F.3d 483, 493 (6th Cir. 2002); Cantrell v.
Huckabee, 433 F. App’x 488, 490 (8th Cir. 2011)).
243
See Martin et al., supra note 174, at 58–61 (finding that the most frequent cause of
unintentional gun-related fatalities of children age fourteen and below in New Mexico from 1984–1988
was playing with loaded guns found within their homes).
244
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 (1998).
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variety negligence, without more, is not enough to shock the conscience.245
Instead, the shocks-the-conscience inquiry asks “whether or not the
objective character of certain conduct is consistent with our traditions,
precedents, and historical understanding of the Constitution and its
meaning.”246
Where, pursuant to a school-created armed-teachers policy, a teacher’s
misplacement or misuse of a firearm on a K-12 campus is an affirmative
act and the proximate cause of a student’s gun-related injury, this act may
very well be conscience shocking, and a plaintiff seeking to hold a teacher
liable under the state-created danger theory will survive a motion to
dismiss, exposing the teacher to potential liability. Ultimately, determining
whether the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits is fact sensitive.
V. THE MONELL CLAIM: SCHOOL DISTRICT “MUNICIPAL” LIABILITY247
Generally, municipalities are not liable for the individual actions of
their employees, even when those actions are unconstitutional.248 Most
circuits will impose municipal liability under § 1983 only when some
municipal policy or custom caused the underlying constitutional violation
by state actors.249 Therefore, in determining whether schools are liable
under a state-created danger theory, the complained-of conduct must have
occurred pursuant to a school-established policy, practice, or custom,
which essentially “ratifie[s]” the unconstitutional conduct of its
employees.250 A § 1983 plaintiff must demonstrate “that defendants, with
deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a
policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the plaintiff]
constitutional harm.”251

245

Kane v. Chester Cnty. Dep’t of Children, Youth & Families, 10 F. Supp. 3d 671, 691 (E.D. Pa.

2014).
246

Lewis, 523 U.S. at 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (concluding that a
municipality is an entity that may be sued under § 1983 “when execution of a government’s policy or
custom . . . inflicts the injury”).
248
See Ian D. Forsythe, A Guide to Civil Rights Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: An Overview of
Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit Precedent, CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, http://www.constitution.org/
brief/forsythe_42-1983.htm [http://perma.cc/E7VD-7ZAN] (last visited July 25, 2015) (“In order to
hold a local government liable under [§] 1983, the Supreme Court has interpreted this causation
element to require that the harm be the result of action on the part of the government entity that
implemented or executed a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by that body’s officers, or the result of the entity’s custom.”).
249
Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1211–13 (3d Cir. 1996).
250
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2000); Sciotto
v. Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 559, 574 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (citing Monfils v. Taylor, 165
F.3d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 1998)).
251
Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989).
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Plaintiffs seeking to hold both the individual state actor and the
municipality liable must prove that the state actor’s underlying
constitutional violation occurred because the actors were behaving in
accord with the municipality’s policy.252
A. Constitutional Violation by a State Employee
The first part of a Monell claim considers whether a state actor violated
the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.253 An underlying constitutional
violation by a state employee—here a teacher—is always a prerequisite to
finding that a municipality is liable under a Monell theory.254
Notably, although a municipality’s Monell liability under § 1983 is
derivative in nature, and is therefore contingent upon an underlying
constitutional violation of the plaintiff’s rights,255 the plaintiff “[does not
have to] obtain a judgment against the individual tortfeasors in order to
establish the liability of the municipality.”256 As such, a school district may
nonetheless incur Monell liability under § 1983 even if an individual
teacher is absolved from individual liability.257 For example, where
“individual defendants violated the plaintiff’s rights but enjoy qualified
immunity, or . . . the plaintiff’s injuries are not solely attributable to the
actions of the named individual defendants,” or the claims against the
individual defendants are dismissed due to certain procedural defects or
settled out of court, the municipality may still face Monell liability.258
The first element of a plaintiff’s Monell claim is satisfied by the
underlying constitutional violation discussed in Part IV above—that is, the
deprivation of a school shooting victim’s Fourteenth Amendment right to
bodily integrity based on a government-created risk. The discussion now
turns to the second element.

252
Sforza v. City of New York, No. 07 Civ. 6122(DLC), 2009 WL 857496, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 2009).
253
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 664 (1978) (quoting Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 190 (1961)).
254
See id. at 692 (“[Section 1983] plainly imposes liability on a government that, under color of
some official policy, ‘causes’ an employee to violate another’s constitutional rights.”).
255
Karen M. Blum, Making Out the Monell Claim Under Section 1983, 25 TOURO L. REV. 829,
850 (2009).
256
Askins v. Doe # 1, 727 F.3d 248, 253 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Curley v. Village of Suffern,
268 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that “a defendant municipality [will not be saved] from liability
where an individual officer is found not liable because of qualified immunity,” with the underlying
rationale being that “the municipality enjoys no qualified immunity shield”).
257
Sforza, 2009 WL 857496, at *10 (“[W]here claims against the individual officers have been
dismissed without reaching their merits, it is still possible for a jury to find a constitutional violation for
which a municipality may, [through] its policies, practices, or customs, be liable.”).
258
McCoy v. City of New York, No. CV 07-4143(RJD)(JO), 2008 WL 3884388, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 13, 2008).
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B. Municipal Liability Based on a Failure to Adequately Train
The second element of a Monell claim requires the plaintiff to prove
that the municipality was somehow responsible for the underlying
constitutional violation. A plaintiff can prove municipal liability under the
policy, practice, or custom theory of liability in one of the following four
ways: (1) the municipality officially adopted or promulgated a policy that
is facially unconstitutional or unconstitutional as applied; (2) the
municipality condoned an unconstitutional custom or practice; (3) the
unconstitutional decisions were made by officials with final policymaking
authority; or (4) the municipality failed to properly train or supervise its
employees with respect to the implementation of a municipal policy.259 In
order to show that a policy caused such harm, the policy must be the
“moving force” of the deprivation of the plaintiff’s federal rights.260
With respect to the armed-teachers approach, plaintiffs are most likely
to succeed under the fourth theory of liability. Pursuant to the “failure to
train” theory, a school district will be held liable if its “failure to train
amounts to deliberate indifference to the [constitutional] rights of persons
with whom the [teachers] come into contact”261 or if the district’s policy is
“objectively deliberately indifferent to the likelihood [that] a particular
constitutional violation would occur.”262
Plaintiffs can satisfy the “deliberate indifference” standard in one of
two ways. First, where there is an obvious need to train, the district will be
deemed to have actual notice, and its failure to train will constitute
deliberate indifference the first time a constitutional violation occurs.263
Second, in cases where the need to train is not obvious, the district will be
deemed to have constructive notice where there is a repeated pattern of
constitutional violations arising from the policy.264
In determining deliberate indifference, the inquiry turns on the
adequacy of the training program in relation to the particular task that the
259
See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (“We hold today that the
inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train
amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.”);
Wragg v. Village of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 2010) (“To establish an official policy or
custom, a plaintiff must show that his constitutional injury was caused ‘by (1) the enforcement of an
express policy of the [village], (2) a widespread practice that is so permanent and well settled as to
constitute a custom or usage with the force of law, or (3) a person with final policymaking authority.’”
(quoting Latuszkin v. City of Chicago, 250 F.3d 502, 504 (7th Cir. 2001))); Vesterhalt v. City of New
York, 667 F.2d 292, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that a plaintiff must prove that the municipality
adopted a policy that is unconstitutional to state a viable § 1983 claim).
260
Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997) (citing Monell
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978)).
261
Harris, 489 U.S. at 388.
262
Blum, supra note 255, at 843.
263
Harris, 489 U.S. at 390.
264
Id. at 396.
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individual state actor must perform pursuant to the municipal policy.265
The plaintiff must generally prove that the inadequate training actually
caused the underlying violation.266
In Young v. City of Providence,267 on-duty police officers accidentally
shot an African American officer, who responded to an incident while offduty, mistaking him for the perpetrator.268 Where the police department
instituted an “always armed/always on duty” policy, the First Circuit held
that a reasonable jury could find that there was an “obvious” need for the
department to train police officers to properly identify other off-duty
officers.269 Finding that the Department could be held liable for its failure
to train, the court relied on ample evidence in the record revealing that it
inadequately trained officers in identifying off-duty police officers.270
Similarly, in Combs v. School District of Philadelphia,271 the court held
that the plaintiff satisfied his burden at summary judgment of proving that
the school had exhibited “deliberate indifference” to the risk to students by
showing that there may have been insufficient training related to school
procedure, which ultimately led to the student’s injury.272
The holdings of Young and Combs indicate that, due to the inherently
dangerous nature of the armed-teachers approach, there is a need for school
districts to properly train teachers so they are ready and able to use
firearms appropriately, thereby minimizing the risk to student
bystanders.273 The deliberate indifference standard is thus satisfied if a
school district’s failure to properly train an armed teacher results in a
student’s gun-related injury or death. As explained above, even the states
that require the highest number of training hours for armed teachers
probably fail to satisfy the proper training requirements under a Monell
analysis.
A year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President Bush signed the
Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act (APAT Act).274 The APAT Act
compels the Transportation Security Administration to arm and train any

265
Id. at 390; see also Cannon v. City of Philadelphia, 86 F. Supp. 2d 460, 472 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(discussing liability in relation to inadequate training).
266
Harris, 489 U.S. at 391.
267
404 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2005).
268
Id. at 9.
269
Id. at 9–10.
270
Id. at 27–28.
271
No. CIV.A.99-3812, 2000 WL 1611061 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2000).
272
Id. at *3. The plaintiff in Combs alleged that the school failed to properly and promptly
respond to an incident during which he was physically attacked by three other students. Id. at *1. The
plaintiff suffered a broken jaw and psychological trauma as a result of the attack. Id.
273
Id. at *4.
274
Where Are the Armed Pilots?, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2003), http://www.washington
times.com/news/2003/dec/11/20031211-085721-8712r/ [http://perma.cc/83CW-LL5T].
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275

airline pilots who volunteer for the program. Once the pilots complete
training and certification, they are known as “Federal Flight Deck
Officers.”276
Pilots wishing to volunteer for the program must complete a
cumbersome, thirteen-page application and submit to a three-hour written
psychological exam probing into the pilot’s most private thoughts,
feelings, opinions, and emotions.277 If a pilot passes the initial examination,
she must report to a government psychologist for a one-on-one interview,
which many pilots (both commercial and military) with top-secret security
clearances fail to pass.278 Assuming the pilot passes the psychological
screening, the pilot has to travel, at her own expense, to Artesia, New
Mexico, where she would undergo an extensive training program.279 Even
with the stringent requirements and built-in hurdles that pilots must
overcome before becoming Federal Flight Deck Officers, the
Transportation Security Administration still retains the power to revoke a
pilot’s Airline Transport Pilot certificate if it deems her a security threat.280
Like pilots, teachers and school officials are entrusted with the safety
of children and are expected to ensure a student’s safe passage throughout
the school day. Despite this, most of the armed-teacher laws do not impose
even minimal psychological evaluation on teachers seeking to carry
firearms on campus.281
When a student is injured in any of the scenarios posed in Part III
above, the school district is vulnerable to liability for implementing an
armed-teacher policy without providing adequate training or conducting
psychological screenings of employees participating in the program. Like
in Young, where the police department’s failure to train employees
properly with respect to the “always armed/always on duty” policy
constituted deliberate indifference to the likelihood of injury or death, a
school district’s failure to properly train teachers to serve as armed security
officers pursuant to an armed-teachers policy rises to the level of deliberate
indifference.282 Research indicates that even highly-trained police officers
miss their intended target in a live-shooter situation 52%–88% of the
275

Id.
Training, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/about-tsa/federal-flight-deckofficers [http://perma.cc/B52T-22L8] (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).
277
Where Are the Armed Pilots?, supra note 274.
278
Id.
279
Id.
280
Id.
281
See infra Appendix.
282
See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989) (“[W]hile claims such as
respondent’s—alleging that the city’s failure to provide training to municipal employees resulted in the
constitutional deprivation she suffered—are cognizable under § 1983, they can only yield liability
against a municipality where that city’s failure to train reflects deliberate indifference to the
constitutional rights of its inhabitants.”).
276
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time. This level of shooting accuracy is undoubtedly much lower for
inadequately trained and improperly screened teachers.
Thus, where the armed-teachers approach requires laypeople to carry
firearms in anticipation of an attack, a school’s deficiency in training its
teachers to carry out the policy safely would be the “moving force” of a
victim’s injuries and would therefore be the primary cause of the
deprivation of a student’s right to bodily integrity.284 Accordingly, a
plaintiff seeking to hold a school district liable for an injury or death
proximately caused by a teacher’s misfire or misuse of a firearm pursuant
to a district’s armed-teachers policy will be able to establish municipal
liability under the state-established policy, practice, or custom theory of
liability.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
With the security trend in primary and secondary schools moving
toward a “guns-blazing” approach, and at least a quarter of states allowing
teachers and other school personnel to carry firearms on campus during the
school day, are American students any safer? How can we be sure that
teachers are effective in a live-shooter situation, especially when the
minimal training requirements vary drastically by state and are, for the
most part, negligible?285 Finally, how can we ask schoolteachers, who are
already tasked with the difficult mission of educating our children, to
assume the additional role of school security guard?
As politicians continue to rapidly push statutory authorizations of the
armed-teachers approach through the legislative process, these questions
will become even more critical. Before hastily adopting such laws,
policymakers should take note of the overwhelming evidence
demonstrating that, without adequate training, laypersons are not prepared
to safely defend bystanders during a live-shooter event simply because
they are armed. In fact, the armed-teacher approach actually elevates the
risk to students during a live-shooter event. School districts authorizing
teachers to carry firearms on campus without providing sufficient training
283

Charles & Copay, supra note 129, at 17.
Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997) (quoting Monell
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978)); see Sciotto v. Marple Newtown Sch.
Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 559, 571 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (“[A] substantive due process violation will be found
where a school official affirmatively acts . . . [which] leads to an invasion of bodily integrity.”).
285
See, e.g., Act of Apr. 22, 2014, § 16-11-127.1(c)(5), 2014 Ga. Laws 432, 434 (requiring only
valid authorization by an authorized official for possession or use of a firearm as it relates to school
safety); Safe Carry Protection Act, § 16-11-130.1(b), 2014 Ga. Laws 599, 616 (requiring general, nonspecific, and non-uniform firearms training); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c04(a)–(b) (West, Westlaw
through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (requiring only eight hours of firearms training); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10505.5 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Gen. Sess.) (requiring no training—only authorization by an
approved official).
284
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are creating a new risk, dangling students above a figurative snake pit of
danger.
When an armed-teacher’s use of a firearm on school grounds is the
proximate cause of a student’s injury or death, that teacher, as a state actor,
may be liable under the government-created risk doctrine. Similarly, after a
school adopts a policy of arming teachers with guns and fails to adequately
train them, it exposes itself to Monell liability for any injuries resulting
from the implementation of such policy. Both of these theories of liability
are viable because of the safety implications of a school’s own invitation of
an inherently dangerous activity onto campus.
Most states that have adopted the armed-teachers approach have
invoked fiscal reasons as their justification.286 But, where the cost of hiring
trained law enforcement or private security officers is relatively low
compared to the potential cost to student lives placed in greater danger as a
result of the armed-teachers approach, the money-saving justification
invoked by most school districts is foolhardy and, at best, illogical.
Finally, schools must not lose sight of the appropriate role and function
of teachers. With teacher effectiveness under a microscope and student
success at the crux of a national debate,287 the armed-teachers approach
unnecessarily muddies the already murky waters.
Teachers are already juggling more responsibilities than they can
arguably handle effectively.288 One disgruntled teacher explained that
“between planning lessons, grading papers, writing tests, coming up with
activities, lunch duty, tutorials and juggling the requirements for [the
school’s] alternative certification program, [she is] stretched to the
286

See supra Part II.
See, e.g., Denise Smith Amos, Teacher Effectiveness Scores Still Spark Controversy, FLA.
TIMES-UNION (Dec. 11, 2014), http://jacksonville.com/news/metro/2014-12-11/story/teacher-effective
ness-scores-still-spark-controversy [http://perma.cc/TT92-546C] (discussing the “Value Added
Model,” which scores teachers based on how well their students performed on state exams); Jon
Campbell, Teachers Question “Validity” of Evaluation Scores, J. NEWS (Dec. 17, 2014),
http://www.lohud.com/story/politics-on-the-hudson/2014/12/16/teachers-question-validity-of-evaluatio
n-scores/20501937/ [http://perma.cc/PV9M-7XPL] (“[T]eachers are getting good marks while less than
40 percent of grade 3–8 students were ‘proficient’ on their math and English exams last year.”); Evan
Grossman, Report Finds Teachers Woefully Unprepared for Classroom Challenges, DAILY SIGNAL
(Dec. 16, 2014), http://dailysignal.com/2014/12/16/report-finds-teachers-woefully-unpreparedclassroom-challenges/ [http://perma.cc/3886-APHD] (“Atop a long list of findings, the report says most
states haven’t done enough to prepare new teachers for the higher standards their students are expected
to achieve.”).
288
See, e.g., Rachel Fairbank, Staggering Workload Leads to Teacher Burnout, CHRON. (Mar. 15,
2014), http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/Fairbank-Staggering-workload-leads-to-teacher5318650.php [http://perma.cc/3Z9V-FGXB] (noting that with all of her duties, the author, a teacher, is
“stretched to the limit”); Liz Riggs, Why Do Teachers Quit?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 18, 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2013/10/why-do-teachers-quit/280699/ [http://perma.cc/
UE4B-UZV7] (“[M]any young teachers soon realize they must do overwhelming amounts of afterhours work. They pour out emotional energy into their work, which breeds quick exhaustion.”).
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limit.” “Research has shown that the most important school-based factor
impacting a child’s academic success is the quality of her classroom
teacher.”290 Despite this, states adopting the armed-teachers approach are
expecting teachers to assume a dual role of both educator and armed
security guard.291
In comparison to the alternatives, the only benefit to the armedteachers approach is that it may be cost-saving for many schools. But,
where the stakes are so high, school districts seeking to increase the
presence of armed guards on campus should hire current or former police
officers or trained security guards, allowing teachers to focus on educating,
and leaving the patrol work to the properly trained experts.

289

Fairbank, supra note 288.
Teachers and Leaders: America’s Engineers of Learning and Growth, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
http://www.ed.gov/teachers-leaders [http://perma.cc/4DZT-FX85] (last visited May 20, 2015).
291
See, e.g., Lisa Fingeroot & Chas Sisk, Tenn. Schools Slow to Embrace Armed Teachers, USA
TODAY (June 2, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/02/tennessee-schoolsarmed-teachers/2383053/ [http://perma.cc/QQL3-4G9Q] (illustrating the reluctance of many school
districts towards having a “police officer-turned-teacher or a volunteer with police experience”
teaching in the school districts under the School Security Act); Oklahoma House Approves Bill to
Allow Armed Teachers in Schools, FOX NEWS POL., (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/
politics/2013/03/13/oklahoma-house-approves-bill-to-allow-armed-teachers-in-schools/ [http://perma.c
c/3BUU-PPSH] (explaining how the Special Reserve School Resource Officer Act “would give
districts the option of paying for teachers to receive a minimum of 120 hours of specialized training in
order to carry a firearm into the school”).
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APPENDIX
1. Alabama
On May 28, 2013, the Alabama State Legislature passed the “Armed
Teachers’ Bill.”292 Instead of allowing all teachers in all districts
throughout the state to carry firearms, the new Alabama law applies only to
Franklin County, allowing teachers and staff to carry firearms at Franklin
County public school campuses.293 Franklin County lies in Northwest
Alabama and has approximately 31,000 residents.294 Franklin County
School District Superintendent Gary Williams justified the adoption of the
bill as a necessity since law enforcement takes more than twenty minutes
to respond to certain rural schools in the district.295
Pursuant to the legislation, any Franklin County principal determining
that “the safety of the students at the school is not adequately protected or
that additional security is necessary to ensure the safety of the students or
employees” may “request volunteers to serve on an emergency security
force.”296 Members of the security force must be current or retired school
district employees or residents of the school district.297 The Franklin
County sheriff reviews the list of volunteers for each school and then has
the option to approve or deny each potential program participant.298 Next,
the sheriff and administrative school personnel develop “a detailed crisis
plan” and establish other rules governing key aspects of the plan, including
the storage and carrying of weapons.299 Further, the firearms must be
approved by the sheriff.300
292
See ALA. CODE § 45-30-103(a), (c) (West, Westlaw through Mar. 1, 2015) (“Upon a
determination by the principal of any Franklin County public K-12 school that the safety of the students
at the school is not adequately protected or that additional security is necessary to ensure the safety of
the students or employees, he or she may request volunteers to serve on an emergency security force
for the school. Volunteers shall consist of current employees of the school, retired employees of the
school, and residents of the school district. . . . Upon formation of an emergency security force, the
sheriff, in conjunction with administrative school personnel, shall prepare a detailed crisis plan for the
school that includes a comprehensive plan of action for the emergency security force to follow in the
event the security of the school is compromised or the safety of students or employees is threatened.
The plan shall also specify how and where weapons may be stored and carried by emergency security
force members and circumstances under which certain weapons may be used.”).
293
Id. § 45-30-103(a).
294
Census 2010 Total Population of Franklin County, Alabama, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml [http://perma.cc/FHE5-G9YQ]
(last visited May 20, 2015).
295
Ala. District to Arm Teachers, Staff, CAMPUS SAFETY MAG. (May 27, 2013),
http://www.campussafetymagazine.com/article/ala-district-to-arm-teachers-staff/Gun_Rights [http://per
ma.cc/QRW4-JPU2].
296
ALA. CODE § 45-30-103(a) (West, Westlaw through Mar. 1, 2015).
297
Id.
298
Id. § 45-30-103(b).
299
Id. § 45-30-103(c).
300
Id.
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Security force members are unpaid, but they may receive a “salary
supplement” from the board of education for their service.301 In addition,
security force members may receive reimbursement for the “actual
necessary expenses incurred in the discharge of [their] duties,” including
any expenses related to weapon procurement and training.302
The legislation classifies members of the emergency security force as
reserve deputy sheriffs.303 According to the law, members must participate
in all training ordered by the sheriff.304 The Franklin County Sheriff’s
Office indicates that reserve deputies are required to attend and qualify
under the Alabama Peace Officers Standards and Training (APOST)
guidelines.305 APOST requirements indicate that trainees are required to
complete a modest forty-three hours of firearms training.306 The statute
itself does not impose specific training obligations.

2. Arkansas
School districts in several states, including Arkansas and Colorado,
have developed creative methods of circumventing state laws that prohibit
guns on school campuses. Although Arkansas law prohibits all individuals
from carrying firearms on any K-12 public or private school campus,307
there is a statutory loophole for “registered commissioned security
guard[s].”308 Its provisions allow the Arkansas Board of Private
Investigators and Private Security Agencies to license and designate
individuals as “commissioned school security officer[s],”309 which the Act
defines as “an individual who “[p]rovides security for the school; and . . .
[h]as received an authorization issued by the director to carry a firearm in
the course of his or her employment.”310 As long as school districts hire
“an individual in the capacity of a commissioned security officer or
commissioned school security officer, the security department of the
private business or school is not required to make application to the
Department of Arkansas State Police for any license.”311
301

Id. § 45-30-103(e).
Id. § 45-30-103(e), (f).
303
Id. § 45-30-103(d).
304
Id.
305
Reserves, FRANKLIN CNTY. SHERIFF’S OFF., www.franklinsheriff.org/page.php?id=12&PHPS
ESSID=6cbfa35ad08fe54472f94be801e44db9 [http://perma.cc/AZ4M-62AB] (last visited Sept. 22,
2015).
306
ALA. PEACE OFFICERS STANDARDS & TRAINING COMM’N ADMIN. CODE R. 650-X-4.-01(3)(e),
www.apostc.state.al.us/Portals/0/APOSTC%20Rulebook.pdf [http://perma.cc/JP5Y-B5T7].
307
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-119(b)(1)(A) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
308
Id. § 5-73-119(e)(4).
309
Id. § 17-40-102(10).
310
Id.
311
Id. § 17-40-103(b)(1). But see Keller, supra note 14, at 694–706 (providing an in-depth
discussion of the Arkansas licensing scheme).
302
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This body of law is relatively new and has been effective only since
September 2015. Prior to that, school boards had to seek licenses from the
Arkansas Board of Private Investigators and Private Security Agencies
allowing them to designate teachers and staff as “private security officers”
under the Act.312 The Board established the requisite training requirements
for applicants to obtain a license.313 The Board’s policies required a meager
ten hours of training.314
Arkansas Attorney General Dustin McDaniel issued an advisory
opinion stating that school district employees cannot be licensed as private
“commissioned security guards” under state law.315 As an initial response
to the advisory opinion, the Board of Private Investigators and Private
Security Agencies issued a temporary suspension of all school district
licenses, but it later reinstated the licenses for a two-year period.316
It remains to be seen whether the Private Security Agency, Private
Investigator, and School Security Licensing and Credentialing Act will
continue to be construed to allow licensure of public school districts as
private security agencies.317 Alternatively, Arkansas teachers and staff can
carry firearms on campus if they participate in the 110 hours of training
and become a “reserve deputy,” an official law enforcement position.318
As in other states, Arkansas’ justification for this approach is fiscal in
nature. “Without money to hire security guards for the five schools [school
superintendent David Hopkins] oversees, giving teachers sixty hours of
training and their own guns seemed like the only reasonable, economical
way to protect the 2,500 public school students in this small town in the
Ozark foothills.”319

312

Keller, supra note 14, at 694–706.
Id.
314
Id.
315
Ark. Att’y Gen., Op. No. 2013-091 (Aug. 1, 2013), http://ag.arkansas.gov/opinions/docs/2013091.html [http://perma.cc/9875-NRTM].
316
See ARK. BD. OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS & PRIVATE SEC. AGENCIES, MINUTES OF THE
MEETING (Sept. 11, 2013), http://arkansasalarm.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2013-09.pdf
[http://perma.cc/22T4-VECN]; Evie Blad, Board Reverses, OKs School-Staff Gunmen, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2013/sep/12/boardreverses-oks-school-staff-gunmen-20130912/ [http://perma.cc/R8SX-G7P3].
317
See generally Keller, supra note 14.
318
See Brenda Bernet, Teachers in 4 Districts Sign Up for Sheriff Reserve-Deputy Training, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2013/oct/28/teachers-4districts-sign-sheriff-reserve-20131028/.
319
Kim Severson, Guns at School? If There’s a Will, There Are Ways, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/28/us/guns-at-school-if-theres-a-will-there-are-ways.html.
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3. Colorado
Not long after the Colorado Legislature rejected two bills320 that would
have authorized school districts to allow teachers and staff to carry guns on
campus, some rural school districts found a clever way around Colorado’s
no-guns-on-campus restriction.321 Under current Colorado law, school
districts may allow only employees who are hired as security officers to
carry concealed firearms on school campuses.322 Despite this prohibition,
at least one Colorado school district has hired teachers as security guards,
requiring them to only take a refresher course twice a year and fire at least
100 rounds a month at the shooting range.323 The Dolores County School
District hired two principals as security officers and entered into contracts
with both of them, memorializing the agreed-upon $1.00-per-year salary as
compensation for their new roles.324
4. Georgia
Although Georgia has historically restricted the possession of firearms
and other weapons on school grounds,325 Governor Nathan Deal recently
signed the Safe Carry Protection Act of 2014, a pro-gun amendment to the
State’s criminal code, allowing certain individuals to carry firearms in
areas otherwise legally designated as “school safety zones.”326 The revised
320
See S.B. 13-009, 69th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013) (allowing school districts to
permit employees to carry concealed handguns on school grounds). An identical bill, H.B. 14-1157,
69th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2014), was introduced in the House.
321
Greg Campbell, Rural Colorado School Allows Teachers to Carry Concealed Weapons, DAILY
CALLER (Oct. 29, 2013), http://dailycaller.com/2013/10/29/rural-colorado-school-allows-teachers-tocarry-concealed-weapons/ [http://perma.cc/Y4RC-V8TE].
322
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-12-214(3)(b) (West, Westlaw through July 1, 2015).
323
Campbell, supra note 321.
324
Colo. School Districts Quietly Taking Up Arms While Gun Debate Rages in Denver, DAILY
CALLER (Feb. 18, 2013, 2:07 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2013/02/18/colo-school-districts-quietlytaking-up-arms-while-gun-debate-rages-in-denver/ [http://perma.cc/5Q4D-X5AY]; Rural Colorado
School District Arms Administrators, Bypasses Colorado Gun Laws, HUFFINGTON POST (May 6, 2013,
2:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/06/rural-colorado-school-dis_n_3224474.html
[http://perma.cc/Y6RS-KYGY].
325
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127.1(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)
(making it unlawful to “carry to or to possess . . . [a weapon or explosive] within a school safety
zone”).
326
Safe Carry Protection Act, § 1-6(c)(6), 2014 Ga. Laws 599, 606; see also Herbert Buchsbaum,
Amid Wave of Pro-Gun Legislation, Georgia Proposes Sweeping Law, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/25/us/amid-wave-of-pro-gun-legislation-georgia-proposes
-sweeping-law.html (characterizing the breadth of the law as “breathtaking”); Steve Osunsami, Georgia
Governor Signs Law Allowing Guns in Schools, Churches, Bars, ABC NEWS (Apr. 23, 2014),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2014/04/georgia-governor-signs-law-allowing-guns-in-schoolschurches-bars/. Governor Nathan Deal proudly announced, “As governor I signed every Second
Amendment piece of legislation that has been placed on my desk and today I will put into law a gun
bill that heralds self-defense, personal liberties and public safety.” Id.
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statute, dubbed by critics as the “guns everywhere” bill,” took effect on
July 1, 2014 and allows any “duly authorized official of a public or private
elementary or secondary school or a public or private technical school,
vocational school, college, university, or other institution of postsecondary education or a local board of education” to possess or use a
firearm which would otherwise be prohibited by the Georgia Code within a
school safety zone, at a school function, or on a bus or other transportation
provided by a school.328 While the law does require boards of education to
adopt a policy with specific provisions governing the training of personnel
approved to carry weapons on campus, it fails to specify a minimum
number of required training hours.329
5. Indiana
Indiana’s Governor recently signed legislation allowing individuals to
store firearms in their vehicles on campus property.330 The legislation
provides defenses to prosecution of gun-related offenses for storing
firearms in a locked vehicle outside of plain sight.331
While the legislation does not directly discuss the use of firearms on
school property, in northeast Indiana, a sheriff offered to deputize teachers
to carry handguns in their classrooms less than a week after the Newtown,
Connecticut school shooting.332 Although a generous community member
donated $27,000 in firearms and three Indiana school districts expressed a
desire to participate in the sheriff’s plan, the effort was foiled when an
insurance company stated that it would refuse to provide workers’
compensation coverage to schools with gun-carrying staff members.333
6. Kansas
On April 16, 2013, the Kansas Legislature passed a law that authorizes
a public school district to allow any individual, school employee or
327
Osunsami, supra note 326. A spokesperson from Americans for Responsible Solutions, a
fierce opponent of the bill, summarized it as follows: “Among its many extreme provisions, it allows
guns in TSA lines at the country’s busiest airport, forces community school boards into bitter, divisive
debates about whether they should allow guns in their children’s classrooms, and broadens the conceal
carry eligibility to people who have previously committed crimes with guns.” Devon M. Sayers &
Elliott C. McLaughlin, Georgia Law Allows Guns in Some Schools, Bars, Churches, CNN (Apr. 23,
2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/23/us/georgia-governor-signs-gun-bill/ [http://perma.cc/8MQMWA6Y].
328
Safe Carry Protection Act, § 1-6(c)(6), 2014 Ga. Laws at 606.
329
See id. § 1-9(b), 2014 Ga. Laws at 616.
330
Act of Mar. 26, 2014, § 4(b)(5), 2014 Ind. Laws 1877, 1883.
331
Id. § 5(b), 2014 Ind. Laws at 1884.
332
Steven Yaccino, Schools Seeking to Arm Employees Hit Hurdle on Insurance, N.Y. TIMES
(July 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/08/us/schools-seeking-to-arm-employees-hit-hurdleon-insurance.html.
333
Id.
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otherwise, to carry a concealed weapon on school district property.334 The
law establishes no minimum standards for school district policies regarding
the possession of firearms on school property other than the requirements
for obtaining concealed carry licensure.335 In addition to other basic
requirements, Kansas imposes modest training requirements for individuals
to obtain a concealed carry permit; indeed, the statute only requires
applicants for concealed carry licenses to complete an accredited eighthour handgun safety course.336 The law does not specify additional firearm
or other experiential training requirements.
Like the Indiana gun law, the new Kansas law may make it difficult for
school districts to obtain insurance coverage. After the new regulations
became law, EMC Insurance Company, the liability insurer for ninety
percent of Kansas’ school districts, cautioned that any districts in the state
permitting employees to carry concealed handguns on school property
would lose or be denied coverage.337
7. Oregon
In Oregon, state law permits individuals “authorized by the officer or
agency that controls the public building to possess a firearm or dangerous
weapon in that public building.”338 The law has been in place for more than
twenty years.339 Notwithstanding the state’s expansive concealed carry
laws, Oregon school districts may impose more limiting weapons
restrictions on school staff, and many Oregon districts ban guns on campus
grounds.340 During the state’s last legislative session, a bill that would have
prohibited all concealed weapons in schools failed in committee with
meager support.341
Nearly a year after the tragic shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary, at
least one Oregon school district lifted a ban that prevented teachers with

334

Act of Apr. 16, 2013, § 9(d), 2013 Kan. Laws 551, 571.
See id.
336
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c04(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
337
Yaccino, supra note 332.
338
OR. REV. STAT. § 166.370(3)(h) (West, Westlaw through Oct. 5, 2015).
339
The specific provision has existed since 1979 and only has been amended once to include the
language “or dangerous weapon.” See Act of July 16, 1979, § 2, 1979 Or. Laws 489, 489.
340
See, e.g., Kristina Chew, Oregon Bans Guns on State University Campuses, CARE2 (Mar. 4,
2012, 1:53 PM), http://www.care2.com/causes/oregon-bans-guns-on-state-university-campuses.html
[http://perma.cc/CU3A-WN5W] (discussing the Oregon State Board of Higher Education’s decision to
ban guns on seven of its state university campuses).
341
See Jeff Mapes, Oregon Gun Bills in Serious Trouble as Courtney Keeps Them from Full
Senate, OREGONIAN (May 6, 2013), http://www.oregonlive.com/mapes/index.ssf/2013/05/
oregon_gun_bills_in_serious_tr.html [http://perma.cc/4E5E-UZ3E] (explaining the decision by the
Oregon Senate President to block four gun-control bills).
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concealed weapon permits from possessing firearms on campus. At the
4-1 vote, during which the St. Helens School Board received no feedback
from teachers in the district about their opinions on the matter, the Board
imposed no restrictions, training requirements, or policy guidelines on the
seven schools within the district.343 Other school boards have considered
following St. Helens’ lead and lifting the concealed weapons ban on school
campuses across Oregon.344
8. South Dakota
On March 8, 2013, the South Dakota Legislature passed a law that
authorizes any school board to “create, establish, and supervise the arming
of school employees, hired security personnel, or volunteers,” to be known
as “school sentinels.”345 School district sentinel programs must be
approved by the local law enforcement official with jurisdiction over the
district.346
Sentinels must complete a training course “as defined by the Law
Enforcement Officers Standards Commission.”347 The South Dakota
Division of Criminal Investigation has developed minimum standards for
school sentinels.348 Minimum standards include “good moral character,” an
examination by a physician for ability to perform duties, and at least eighty
hours of training with yearly renewal tests.349 Sentinels must also maintain
their concealed carry licensure.350
The South Dakota law was enacted to ameliorate the economic burden
of providing effective security in public schools. In South Dakota, bill
sponsor Representative Scott Craig of Rapid City explained that rural
districts do not have sufficient funding to support expenditures on full-time
342
See Alexis Shaw, Ore. School Board Votes to Allow Staff to Pack Heat at School, ABC NEWS
(Oct. 26, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/ore-school-board-votes-staff-pack-heat-school/story?id=2
0692287.
343
Id.; see also ST. HELENS SCH. DIST. #502, BOARD OF DIRECTORS REGULAR MEETING
MINUTES (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.sthelens.k12.or.us/cms/lib05/OR01000906/Centricity/Domain/
706/RegularMeetingMinutes10.23.2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/AX5S-6F84].
344
See, e.g., Michael Bamesberger, Estacada School Board Discusses Allowing Staff, Teachers to
Carry Concealed Weapons, OREGONIAN (Nov. 22, 2013, 3:05 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/
clackamascounty/index.ssf/2013/11/estacada_school_board_opens_di.html
[http://perma.cc/HNK6Y6AN] (explaining that the Estacada School District and the Eagle Point School District are
considering altering their weapons policies so that teachers and school staff may carry concealed
weapons on campus).
345
Act of Mar. 8, 2013, § 1, 2013 S.D. Sess. Laws 210, 210.
346
Id. § 2, 2013 S.D. Sess. Laws at 210.
347
Id. § 3, 2013 S.D. Sess. Laws at 210.
348
S.D. DIV. OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, SCHOOL SENTINEL 2–4, dci.sd.gov/LinkClick.aspx
?fileticket=gG3T8JZk7Ag%3D&tabid=555 [http://perma.cc/MEK3-KV3U] (last visited Aug. 13,
2015).
349
Id. at 2, 5.
350
Act of Mar. 8, 2013, § 5, 2013 S.D. Sess. Laws at 210.
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law enforcement officers and, as a result, “they are interested in arming
teachers or volunteers.”351
9. Tennessee
Tennessee’s guns-in-schools law went into effect on July 1, 2013.352
The law allows school employees and persons “assigned to a school in
accordance with a memorandum of understanding between the chief of the
appropriate law enforcement agency and the [school district]” to carry
firearms on campus.353
Tennessee requires that individuals wishing to possess firearms on
school property have a concealed carry license, receive written permission
from both the “director of schools” and school principal, and be a “law
enforcement officer, or have prior service as a law enforcement officer.”354
The law mandates forty hours of basic training in school policing.355
10. Texas
The Protection of Texas Children Act, the Texas guns-in-school
legislation, went into effect on June 14, 2013.356 The law allows school
districts to appoint “school marshals” that carry firearms according to the
district’s written regulations and only at specific schools approved by the
district.357
The law specifies several topics that must be included or addressed by
districts in their written school policies. Applicants must be school
employees holding concealed handgun licenses.358 In addition, district
training programs are required to include eighty hours of instruction and
psychological examinations.359 However, a marshal that has “regular,
direct contact with students” may not carry a concealed handgun.360
Instead, the law requires the marshal to store the firearm “in a locked and
secured safe within the marshal’s immediate reach when conducting the
marshal’s primary duty.”361 In addition, the law limits the presence of guns
on campus by restricting the number of school marshals to one per every
351
South Dakota Governor Signs Bill Allowing Armed Teachers in the Classroom, FOX NEWS
(Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/03/08/sd-governor-signs-bill-allowing-teachersto-be-armed/ [http://perma.cc/3MQF-FRJY].
352
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-815 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.).
353
Id. § 49-6-815(a).
354
Id. § 49-6-815(b).
355
Id. § 49-6-815(b)(3).
356
Protection of Texas Children Act, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 1742, 1746.
357
Id. § 3, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1742–43.
358
Id. § 5, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1743.
359
Id. § 5, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1743–44.
360
Id. § 3, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1743.
361
Id.
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362

400 students. Opponents of this approach worry about gun access and its
potential to result in an increase of gun-related injuries and death on
campus.363
11. Utah
Utah is one of the only states that authorizes individuals who hold
concealed carry permits to carry licensed, concealed weapons onto public
school campuses without exception.364 Thus, it is inferred that teachers
who hold concealed carry licenses could do so. In order to be issued a
license and be allowed to carry a concealed gun, an individual must,
among other things, pass a background check and undergo the required
training.365 Thus, in Utah, teachers who meet all of the statutory licensing
requirements are eligible to obtain a license and carry a concealed gun into
public schools. Because permit records are closed to the public,366 parents
have no way of knowing which teachers carry weapons.
12. Other States
Numerous other states’ laws require only school board approval, or
sometimes even less stringent requirements, in order to arm district
employees.367 Hawaii’s and New Hampshire’s silence on the issue of
362

Id. § 3, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws at 1742.
See David Conrads, Texas School Marshals: Armed and Covert, but Will They Help?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 31, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Education/2014/0731/
Texas-school-marshals-Armed-and-covert-but-will-they-help [http://perma.cc/KE2R-GHLY].
364
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-505.5(4)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Gen. Sess.)
(providing that the ban does not apply to those authorized to possess a firearm who have official
permits as regulated by statute); id. § 76-10-505.5(4)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Gen. Sess.)
(providing an exemption from punishment for carrying a weapon on school grounds when the
“possession is approved by the responsible school administrator”).
365
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5-704 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Gen. Sess.) (requiring a
variety of identifying documents and training to obtain “general familiarity”).
366
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5-708(1)(b), (c) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Gen. Sess.).
367
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.61.210 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.)
(stating that a person commits a crime in the fourth degree if they possess a weapon without “the
permission of the chief administrative officer of the school or district or the designee of the chief
administrative officer, within the buildings of, on the grounds of, or on the school parking lot of a
public or private preschool, elementary, junior high, or secondary school”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (allowing the possession of a firearm in a school zone with
the permission of the school district superintendent or his designee); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a217b (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. and June Spec. Sess.) (excepting from conviction those
carrying weapons on school grounds when possessing the weapon as a part of a program approved by
school officials); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3302D(4)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.
and 1st Ex. Sess.) (excepting from punishment those possessing weapons on school grounds “as an
appropriate part of a program, an event, activity or other circumstance approved by the board of
trustees or governing board”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 724.4B(2)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess.) (excepting from punishment those carrying weapons on school grounds who have been
“specifically authorized by the school” to do so); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 527.070(3)(f) (West, Westlaw
363
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allowing district employees to carry concealed firearms has been
interpreted to effectively allow the practice.368
At least nineteen states have recently proposed legislation regarding
the possession of firearms by district employees on K-12 school
campuses.369

through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (excepting “[a]ny other persons . . . who have been authorized to carry a
firearm by the board of education or board of trustees of the public or private institution” from
punishment); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 10(j) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 84 of 1st Annual
Sess.) (excepting from punishment those with authorization from a school board or officer in charge to
carry firearms on school grounds); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-361(3)(b) (West, Westlaw through
chapters effective July 1, 2015, 2015 Sess.) (“The trustees of a district may grant persons and entities
advance permission to possess, carry, or store a weapon in a school building.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:39-5 (West, Westlaw through 2015 legislation) (excepting those with permission from governing
officer of institution from punishment when carrying weapons on school grounds); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
265.01-a (McKinney, Westlaw through Ch. 1–238 of L.2015) (excepting those with written
authorization from an educational institution from penalty for carrying weapon on school grounds) .
368
Guns in Schools in Hawaii, L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (Jan. 2, 2012),
http://smartgunlaws.org/guns-in-schools-in-hawaii/ [http://perma.cc/VR56-WP74]; Guns in Schools in
New Hampshire, L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (Jan. 29, 2015), http://smartgunlaws.org/gunsin-schools-in-new-hampshire/ [http://perma.cc/S6T8-H76L].
369
See, e.g., H.B. 562, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015); H.B. 2412, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Ariz. 2014); H.R. 1012, 89th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Ark. 2014); H.B. 753, 116th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 2014); H.B. 707, 40th Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2014); S.B. 656, 97th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess.
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